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The Effects of Time Preferences on Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games

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  • Jeongbin Kim

Abstract

This paper studies the effects of time preferences on cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game experiment. Subjects play repeated games in the lab, all decisions at once, but stage game payoffs are paid over an extended period of time. Changing the time window of stage game payoffs (weekly or monthly) varies discount factors, and a delay for the first-stage game payoffs eliminates/weakens present bias. First, subjects with weekly payments cooperate more than subjects with monthly payments—higher discount factors promote greater cooperation. Second, the rate of cooperation is higher when there is a delay—present bias reduces cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeongbin Kim, 2023. "The Effects of Time Preferences on Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 618-637, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:15:y:2023:i:1:p:618-37
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200195
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    Cited by:

    1. Manuel A. Utset, 2023. "Time-Inconsistent Bargaining and Cross-Commitments," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-21, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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