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Term Limits and Bargaining Power in Electoral Competition

Author

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  • Germán Gieczewski

Abstract

I study a dynamic model of electoral competition between candidates with heterogeneous valence. When the candidates' and voters' policy preferences differ, the winner extracts rents, limited only by the voters' threat of electing the weaker candidate. This threat becomes more costly to the voters when the relevant time horizon is longer. Thus, term limits can increase the voters' bargaining power and their welfare. Term limits are even more important for curbing rent extraction if entry is strategic, as in that case strong incumbents face weaker competition. The paper also compares the welfare properties of seniority caps and stochastic term limits.

Suggested Citation

  • Germán Gieczewski, 2022. "Term Limits and Bargaining Power in Electoral Competition," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 1-34, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:3:p:1-34
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180033
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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