IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejmic/v13y2021i3p328-71.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Vertical Agreements and User Access

Author

Listed:
  • Germain Gaudin
  • Alexander White

Abstract

Platforms acting as sales channels for producers often charge users for access via a subscription fee or a markup on hardware. We compare two common forms of vertical pricing agreement that platforms use with sellers: per unit and proportional fees. In particular, we analyze the critical role that user access plays on prices, profits, and welfare under both forms of agreement. We characterize this role and show how it potentially overturns standard results saying that proportional fees lead to lower prices and higher profits.

Suggested Citation

  • Germain Gaudin & Alexander White, 2021. "Vertical Agreements and User Access," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 328-371, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:13:y:2021:i:3:p:328-71
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180339
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20180339
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/mic.20180339.ds
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1257/mic.20180339?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Etro, Federico, 2023. "Platform competition with free entry of sellers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    2. Loginova, Oksana, 2022. "Branded websites and marketplace selling: Competing during COVID-19," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 203(C), pages 577-592.
    3. Romain Lestage, 2021. "Input price discrimination and non-controlling vertical shareholding," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 226-250, June.
    4. D’Annunzio, Anna & Russo, Antonio, 2024. "Platform Transaction Fees and Freemium Pricing," TSE Working Papers 24-1569, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    5. Kawaguchi, Kohei & Kuroda, Toshifumi & Sato, Susumu, 2023. "Relevant markets and market power of mobile apps," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    6. Federico Etro, 2024. "e‐Commerce platforms and self‐preferencing," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(4), pages 1516-1543, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:13:y:2021:i:3:p:328-71. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.