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Revealed Preference Implications of Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection

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  • Pablo Schenone

Abstract

Consider a decision-maker (DM) who must select an alternative from a set of mutually exclusive alternatives but must take this decision sequentially. If the DM's choice correspondence over subsets of alternatives satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP), then the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) and backward induction (BI) strategies coincide. We study the relation between the SPNE and BI strategies when the DM's choice correspondence fails to satisfy WARP. First, Sen's axiom alpha is necessary and sufficient for the set of SPNE strategies to be a subset of the set of BI strategies; moreover, a mild strengthening of Sen's axiom β is necessary and sufficient for the set of BI strategies to be a subset of the set of SPNE strategies. These results extend to multiplayer games.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Schenone, 2020. "Revealed Preference Implications of Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 230-256, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:12:y:2020:i:2:p:230-56
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180077
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    Cited by:

    1. Nishimura, Hiroki, 2021. "Revealed preferences of individual players in sequential games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory

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