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Financial Intermediation, Leverage, and Macroeconomic Instability

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  • Gregory Phelan

Abstract

This paper investigates how financial sector leverage affects macroeconomic instability and welfare. In the model, banks borrow (use leverage) to allocate resources to productive projects and provide liquidity. When banks do not actively issue new equity, aggregate outcomes depend on the level of equity in the financial sector. Equilibrium is inefficient because agents do not internalize how their decisions affect volatility, aggregate leverage, and the returns on assets. Leverage creates systemic risk, which increases the frequency and duration of crises. Limiting leverage decreases asset price volatility and increases expected returns, which decrease the likelihood that the financial sector is undercapitalized.

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  • Gregory Phelan, 2016. "Financial Intermediation, Leverage, and Macroeconomic Instability," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 199-224, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:8:y:2016:i:4:p:199-224
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mac.20140233
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    Cited by:

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    2. Brunnermeier, M.K. & Sannikov, Y., 2016. "Macro, Money, and Finance," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1497-1545, Elsevier.
    3. Thomas M. Eisenbach & Gregory Phelan, 2023. "Fragility of Safe Assets," Working Papers 23-02, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    4. Herradi, Mehdi El & Leroy, Aurélien, 2022. "The rich, poor, and middle class: Banking crises and income distribution," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    5. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Yuliy Sannikov, 2015. "International Credit Flows and Pecuniary Externalities," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 297-338, January.
    6. Andrea Modena, 2020. "Recapitalization, Bailout, and Long-run Welfare in a Dynamic Model of Banking," Working Papers 2020:23, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    7. Douglas Gale & Andrea Gamba & Marcella Lucchetta, 2018. "Dynamic Bank Capital Regulation in Equilibrium," 2018 Meeting Papers 680, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Caio Machado, 2024. "Coordinating in Financial Crises," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 54, October.
    9. P. J. Glandon & Ken Kuttner & Sandeep Mazumder & Caleb Stroup, 2023. "Macroeconomic Research, Present and Past," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 1088-1126, September.
    10. Hydzulkifli Hashim Omar* & Abubakar Yusuf Sanyinna, 2018. "Administrative Challenges of WAQF Institution in the Contemporary World: Future Prospects," The Journal of Social Sciences Research, Academic Research Publishing Group, pages 294-299:6.
    11. William Chen & Gregory Phelan, 2023. "Should Monetary Policy Target Financial Stability," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 49, pages 181-200, July.
    12. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Yuliy Sannikov, 2016. "Macro, Money and Finance: A Continuous Time Approach," NBER Working Papers 22343, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Pietro Dindo & Andrea Modena & Loriana Pelizzon, 2019. "Risk Pooling, Leverage, and the Business Cycle," Working Papers 2019: 21, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    14. William Chen & Gregory Phelan, 2018. "Dynamic Consequences of Monetary Policy for Financial Stability," Department of Economics Working Papers 2018-06, Department of Economics, Williams College.
    15. Larsson, Bo & Wijkander, Hans, 2015. "Dynamic Banking with Endogenous Risk Based Funding Cost: Value Maximization, Risk-taking, Responses to Regulation and Credit Contraction," Research Papers in Economics 2015:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    16. Antoine Camous & Alejandro Van der Ghote, 2023. "Evaluating the Financial Instability Hypothesis: A Positive and Normative Analysis of Leveraged Risk-Taking and Extrapolative Expectations," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_431v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, revised May 2024.
    17. Zhiyong Zheng & Jian He & Yingjie Yang & Mengting Zhang & Desheng Wu & Yang Bian & Jianhong Cao, 2023. "Does financial leverage volatility induce systemic financial risk? Empirical insight based on the Chinese fintech sector," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(2), pages 1142-1161, March.
    18. Martins, António Miguel, 2023. "Stock market effects of silicon valley bank and credit suisse failure: evidence for a sample of european listed banks," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(PA).
    19. Chen, William & Phelan, Gregory, 2021. "International coordination of macroprudential policies with capital flows and financial asymmetries," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    20. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Yuliy Sannikov, 2012. "Redistributive monetary policy," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 331-384.
    21. Mao, Jie & Shen, Guanxiong & Yan, Jingzhou, 2023. "A continuous-time macro-finance model with Knightian uncertainty," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    22. William Chen & Gregory Phelan, 2023. "Should Monetary Policy Target Financial Stability," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 49, pages 181-200, July.
    23. Begenau, Juliane, 2020. "Capital requirements, risk choice, and liquidity provision in a business-cycle model," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(2), pages 355-378.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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