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A Behavioral Model of the Popularity and Regulation of Demandable Liabilities

Author

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  • Julio J. Rotemberg

Abstract

Overoptimism regarding one's ability to arrive early in a queue is shown to rationalize deposit contracts in which people can withdraw their funds on demand even if consumption takes place later. Capitalized institutions serving overoptimistic depositors emerge in equilibrium even if depositors and bank owners have identical preferences and investment opportunities. Consistent with the evidence, runs can lead people to move their deposits from one intermediary to another. Regulatory policies, including deposit insurance, minimum capital requirements and restrictions on the assets held by depository institutions can increase the ex ante welfare of depositors. (JEL G21, G28, G32, L51)

Suggested Citation

  • Julio J. Rotemberg, 2015. "A Behavioral Model of the Popularity and Regulation of Demandable Liabilities," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 123-152, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:7:y:2015:i:3:p:123-52
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mac.20130143
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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