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When Individual Politics Become Public: Do Civil Service Protections Insulate Government Workers?

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  • Morgan Foy

Abstract

This paper examines whether the civil service system protected state bureaucrats from political interference following a recall petition against the governor of Wisconsin. I find that most classified workers, who were covered by the state civil service laws, were paid equally by signing status following the public disclosure of the petition list. Conversely, signers in the unclassified service, a smaller set of government positions, were paid about 3 percent less annually relative to nonsigners in the postdisclosure period. These results indicate that the civil service insulated qualified bureaucrats, while uncovered workers faced retribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Morgan Foy, 2024. "When Individual Politics Become Public: Do Civil Service Protections Insulate Government Workers?," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 292-322, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:16:y:2024:i:3:p:292-322
    DOI: 10.1257/app.20220723
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets

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