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Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act

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  • Diana Moreira
  • Santiago Pérez

Abstract

We use newly digitized data to study the impacts of a historical reform that mandated exams for some employees in the largest US customs-collection districts. Although the reform improved targeted employees' professional backgrounds and reduced turnover, it did not lead to significant improvements in the cost-effectiveness of customs revenue collection. The incomplete reach of the reform was key for this partial success. First, the reform incentivized hiring in exam-exempted positions, distorting districts' hierarchical structure. Second, since we find suggestive evidence that districts' top managers mattered for performance, not changing their appointment method might have constituted a missed opportunity for improvement.

Suggested Citation

  • Diana Moreira & Santiago Pérez, 2024. "Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 250-291, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:16:y:2024:i:3:p:250-91
    DOI: 10.1257/app.20220284
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    Cited by:

    1. Moreira, Diana B. & Perez, Santiago, 2022. "Who Benefits from Meritocracy?," IZA Discussion Papers 15341, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • N31 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913

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