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Does Electoral Competition Curb Party Favoritism?

Author

Listed:
  • Marta Curto-Grau
  • Albert Solé-Ollé
  • Pilar Sorribas-Navarro

Abstract

We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel public spending towards co-partisan officials more than is the case of incumbents that are worried about reelection. We draw on data on capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during 1995–2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that a mayor belonging to the party of the regional president obtains twice the amount in grants received by an opposition's mayor. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears for highly competitive elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Marta Curto-Grau & Albert Solé-Ollé & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, 2018. "Does Electoral Competition Curb Party Favoritism?," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 378-407, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:10:y:2018:i:4:p:378-407
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.20160618
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories

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    1. Does Electoral Competition Curb Party Favoritism? (American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2018) in ReplicationWiki

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