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Simultaneous Model of Innovation, Secrecy, and Patent Policy

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Listed:
  • Klaus Kultti
  • Tuomas Takalo
  • Juuso Toikka

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Klaus Kultti & Tuomas Takalo & Juuso Toikka, 2006. "Simultaneous Model of Innovation, Secrecy, and Patent Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 82-86, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:2:p:82-86
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/000282806777211928
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, 2007. "An Empirical Look at Software Patents," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 157-189, March.
    2. Carl Shapiro, 2006. "Prior User Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 92-96, May.
    3. Varian,Hal R. & Farrell,Joseph & Shapiro,Carl, 2004. "The Economics of Information Technology," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521844154, September.
    4. Klaus Kultti & Tuomas Takalo & Juuso Toikka, 2005. "Patents Hinder Collusion," Industrial Organization 0503015, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Wesley M. Cohen & Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 2000. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)," NBER Working Papers 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Klaus Kultti & Tuomas Takalo & Juuso Toikka, 2007. "Secrecy versus patenting," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(1), pages 22-42, March.
    7. Nancy T. Gallini, 2002. "The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 131-154, Spring.
    8. Kultti, Klaus & Takalo, Tuomas, 2008. "Optimal fragmentation of intellectual property rights," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 137-149, January.
    9. Vincenzo Denicolò & Luigi Alberto Franzoni, 2004. "Patents, Secrets, and the First‐Inventor Defense," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 517-538, September.
    10. repec:bla:econom:v:69:y:2002:i:276:p:535-47 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Denicolo, Vincenzo & Franzoni, Luigi Alberto, 2003. "The contract theory of patents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 365-380, December.
    12. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2004. "Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 1-22, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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