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Reinsuring Risk to Increase Access to Health Insurance

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  • Katherine Swartz

Abstract

At least 41 million Americans are currently without health insurance in any given month (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002). They are uninsured for a variety of reasons, and most people who lack coverage are affected by more than one reason. Two generalizations can be made, however. First, a majority simply cannot afford to purchase health insurance unless it is heavily subsidized. Most do not have access to employer-sponsored coverage and so must purchase any insurance in the non-group (individual) health-insurance market - a market where, as I explain below, insurance is typically twice as expensive as employer-group coverage if it is not denied outright. Since about two-thirds of the uninsured have incomes below $35,000, non-group health-insurance premiums often exceed 10 percent of their incomes. The second generalization is that, to an important extent, high premiums in the non-group market and denial of coverage reflect market failure due to asymmetric information. Insurers can never know as much as an individual does about his or her health, family history of health problems, and tendency to seek medical care. Because of this asymmetry, it is impossible for an insurer to set premiums that accurately reflect the non-random portion of health-care costs for different individuals. The non-group market is the only health-insurance option for people without employersponsored coverage. Tax-related subsidies as proposed by members of Congress and the Bush administration do not address the market-failure problems and so are unlikely to make insurance much more affordable. To increase access to health insurance, risk in the non-group market needs to be shifted to a broader population base. In what follows, I first describe the three distinct health-insurance markets in which people can obtain health insurance, and the special nature of competition among insurance companies in the non-group market. Then I make the case for government to act as reinsurer and assume the risk of extremely high-cost people. Efficiency in the non-group health-insurance market would be improved if the government reinsured the market. Equity also would be increased if the government acted as reinsurer because more uninsured people would have access to insurance. Finally, I describe precedents for this role for government in other markets, and why tax-related subsidies will not succeed in increasing health-insurance coverage unless the risks of extremely high costs are shifted to the government.

Suggested Citation

  • Katherine Swartz, 2003. "Reinsuring Risk to Increase Access to Health Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 283-287, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:2:p:283-287
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/000282803321947209
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. John F. Cogan & R. Glenn Hubbard & Daniel P. Kessler, 2008. "The Effect of Medicare Coverage for the Disabled on the Market for Private Insurance," NBER Working Papers 14309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Bijlsma, Michiel & Boone, Jan & Zwart, Gijsbert, 2017. "The complementarity between risk adjustment and community rating: Distorting market outcomes to facilitate redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 21-37.
    3. Richard J. Cebula, 2008. "Does Direct Democracy Increase Voter Turnout? Evidence from the 2004 General Election," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(4), pages 629-644, October.
    4. Bijlsma, M. & Boone, Jan & Zwart, G.T.J., 2015. "Community Rating in Health Insurance : Trade-Off Between Coverage and Selection," Other publications TiSEM f95e5efa-523c-48e2-9ea1-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Richard Cebula & Michael Toma, 2006. "Determinants of Geographic Differentials in the Voter Participation Rate," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 34(1), pages 33-40, March.
    6. repec:kap:iaecre:v:14:y:2008:i:3:p:336-347 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Michiel Bijlsma & Jan Boone & Gijsbert Zwart, 2014. "Competition leverage: how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(4), pages 792-815, December.
    8. Richard J. Cebula, 2008. "Small Firm Size and Health Insurance: A Private Enterprise Perspective," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 24(Fall 2008), pages 51-77.
    9. Padmaja Ayyagari, 2019. "Health Insurance and Early Retirement Plans: Evidence from the Affordable Care Act," American Journal of Health Economics, MIT Press, vol. 5(4), pages 533-560, Fall.
    10. Scott E. Harrington, 2010. "The Health Insurance Reform Debate," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 5-38, March.
    11. Cogan, John F. & Hubbard, R. Glenn & Kessler, Daniel P., 2010. "The effect of Medicare coverage for the disabled on the market for private insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 418-425, May.
    12. Ronald Eduardo Gómez Suárez, 2007. "Cream-Skimming And Risk Adjustment in Colombian Health Insurance System:: The Public Insurer Case," Archivos de Economía 4295, Departamento Nacional de Planeación.
    13. Richard Cebula & Anthony Bopp, 2008. "Estimating the Percentage of the US Population without Health Insurance: An Ecological Approach," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 14(3), pages 336-347, August.
    14. Richard Cebula & Holly Meads, 2008. "The Electoral College System, Political Party Dominance, and Voter Turnout, With Evidence from the 2004 Presidential Election," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 36(1), pages 53-64, March.
    15. Hsu, Minchung, 2008. "Health Insurance, the Social Welfare System and Household Saving," MPRA Paper 21281, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2010.
    16. Cebula, Richard, 2010. "Effects of Health Insurance and Medical Care Inflation on Voluntary Enlistment in the Army: An Empirical Study in the United States," MPRA Paper 51246, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Alexander, Gigi & Cebula, Richard & Saadatmand, Yassamand, 2005. "Determinants of the Percent of the Population Enrolled in HMOs," MPRA Paper 51268, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Kanika Kapur & M. Susan Marquis & Melinda J. Beeuwkes Buntin & José J. Escarce & Thomas A. Louis, 2005. "Is the individual market more than a bridge market? An analysis of disenrollment decisions," Open Access publications 10197/269, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    19. Gill, Balbinder Singh, 2023. "Health uninsurance premium and mortgage interest rates," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    20. Dow William H & Fulton Brent D & Baicker Katherine, 2010. "Reinsurance for High Health Costs: Benefits, Limitations, and Alternatives," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 1-23, July.
    21. Rodriguez, Hector P. & Laugesen, Miriam J. & Watts, Carolyn A., 2010. "A randomized experiment of issue framing and voter support of tax increases for health insurance expansion," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 98(2-3), pages 245-255, December.

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