Examining Risk Preferences under High Monetary Incentives: Reply
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Cited by:
- Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Joel Waldfogel, 2003.
"Social Learning and Coordination in High-Stakes Games: Evidence from Friend or Foe,"
CREMA Working Paper Series
2003-01, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Joel Waldfogel & Matthew White, 2003. "Social Learning and Coordination in High-Stakes Games: Evidence from Friend or Foe," NBER Working Papers 9805, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joanna Ho & L. Keller & Pamela Keltyka, 2005. "How Do Information Ambiguity and Timing of Contextual Information Affect Managers’ Goal Congruence in Making Investment Decisions in Good Times vs. Bad Times?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 163-186, September.
- Cardinaels, Eddy & Jia, Y., 2015. "How audits moderate the effects of incentives and peer behavior on misreporting," Other publications TiSEM 15e939fa-d6dd-4bda-824d-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Robert S. Shupp & Arlington W. Williams, 2008.
"Risk preference differentials of small groups and individuals,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 258-283, January.
- RobertS. Shupp & ArlingtonW. Williams, 2008. "Risk preference differentials of small groups and individuals," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 258-283, January.
- Robert S. Shupp & Arlington Williams, 2003. "Risk Preference Differentials of Small Groups and Individuals," Working Papers 200301, Ball State University, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2006.
- Robert S. Shupp & Arlington W. Williams, 2006. "Risk Preference Differentials of Small Groups and Individuals," CAEPR Working Papers 2006-006, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
- M. Levati & Andrea Morone & Annamaria Fiore, 2009.
"Voluntary contributions with imperfect information: An experimental study,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 199-216, January.
- Annamaria Fiore & M. Vittoria Levati & Andrea Morone, 2006. "Voluntary contributions with imperfect information: An experimental study," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-30, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
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