Existence of Consistent Conjectures: Reply
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Weretka, Marek, 2011. "Endogenous market power," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2281-2306.
- Boone, Jan, 2002.
"'Be Nice, Unless it Pays to Fight': A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3342, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Boone, J., 2002. "'Be Nice Unless it Pays to Fight' : A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy," Discussion Paper 2002-23, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Boone, J., 2003. "'Be nice, unless it pays to fight' : A new theory of price determination with implications for competition policy," Discussion Paper 2003-011, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Jan Boone, 2002. "’Be nice, unless it pays to fight’: A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-18, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Tina Kao & Flavio Menezes & John Quiggin, 2014.
"Optimal access regulation with downstream competition,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 75-93, February.
- Flavio Menezes & John Quiggin & Tina Kao, 2012. "Optimal Access Regulation with Downstream Competition," Discussion Papers Series 473, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Kao, Tina & Menezes, Flavio & Quiggin, John, 2012. "Optimal access regulation with downstream competition," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers 151201, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
- Boone, J., 2002. "'Be Nice Unless it Pays to Fight' : A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy," Other publications TiSEM 739723a0-ffec-49c9-bef8-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Atsuhiro Satoh & Yasuhito Tanaka, 2014.
"Irrelevance of Conjectural Variations in Duopoly under Relative Profit Maximization and Consistent Conjectures,"
Journal of Economics and Management, College of Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan, vol. 10(2), pages 101-115, July.
- Satoh, Atsuhiro & Tanaka, Yasuhito, 2014. "Irrelevance of conjectural variation in duopoly under relative profit maximization and consistent conjectures," MPRA Paper 55881, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lagarto, João & Sousa, Jorge A.M. & Martins, Álvaro & Ferrão, Paulo, 2014. "Market power analysis in the Iberian electricity market using a conjectural variations model," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 292-305.
- Holloway, Garth J., 1995. "Conjectural Variations With Fewer Apologies," Working Papers 225880, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:73:y:1983:i:3:p:457-58. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.