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Competition and Unanimity

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  • DeAngelo, Harry

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  • DeAngelo, Harry, 1981. "Competition and Unanimity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(1), pages 18-27, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:71:y:1981:i:1:p:18-27
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    Cited by:

    1. Kuersten, Wolfgang & Linde, Rainer, 2011. "Corporate hedging versus risk-shifting in financially constrained firms: The time-horizon matters!," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 502-525, June.
    2. José Azar & Xavier Vives, 2018. "Oligopoly, Macroeconomic Performance, and Competition Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 7189, CESifo.
    3. Francesca Busetto & Giulio Codognato & Giorgia Pavan & Simone Tonin, 2023. "Cournotian duopolistic firms may be Walrasian: a case in the Gabszewicz and Vial model," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 140(2), pages 121-140, October.
    4. Miguel Antón & Florian Ederer & Mireia Giné & Martin Schmalz, 2023. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(5), pages 1294-1355.
    5. José Azar & Xavier Vives, 2021. "General Equilibrium Oligopoly and Ownership Structure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 999-1048, May.
    6. Gregory Dow, 1996. "Replicating Walrasian equilibria using markets for membership in labor-managed firms," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 147-162, December.
    7. Barzel, Yoram, 1997. "Parliament as a wealth-maximizing institution: The right to the residual and the right to vote," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 455-474, December.
    8. Josef Schosser, 2020. "Real Option Exercise Decisions in Information Technology Investments: a Comment," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 1-7, December.
    9. Paul Seabright, 1993. "Managing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 113-134, Fall.
    10. Lemma W. Senbet & Robert A. Taggart, Jr., 1981. "Capital Structure Equilibrium under Incomplete Market Conditions," NBER Working Papers 0747, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Wilhelm, Jochen, 2002. "Risikoabschläge, Risikozuschläge und Risikoprämien: Finanzierungstheoretische Anmerkungen zu einem Grundproblem der Unternehmensbewertung," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Betriebswirtschaftliche Reihe 9, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    12. James A. Ohlson, 1987. "On the nature of income measurement: The basic results," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 4(1), pages 1-15, September.
    13. Klaus Ritzberger & Frank Milne, 2002. "Strategic pricing of equity issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(2), pages 271-294.
    14. Jack Hirshleifer, 1985. "Investment Decision Criteria," UCLA Economics Working Papers 365, UCLA Department of Economics.
    15. Claudio Loderer & Lukas Roth & Urs Waelchli & Petra Joerg, 2010. "Shareholder Value: Principles, Declarations, and Actions," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 39(1), pages 5-32, March.
    16. Robinson, Chris, 1996. "Can we reconcile finance with nature?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 185-195.
    17. Schosser, Josef, 2016. "Time (in)consistency and real options: Much ado about nothing?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 77-84.
    18. Kürsten, Wolfgang, 2013. "35 Jahre Jensen/Meckling und das Missverständnis um die (wahre) Zielfunktion der Aktionäre – Finanzierungstheoretisches Plädoyer zur Eignung der Principal-Agent-Theorie für die Lösung von Problemen de," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 67(1), pages 8-22.
    19. Dow,Gregory K., 2019. "The Labor-Managed Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107589650, October.
    20. Cynthia Van Hulle, 1983. "Dominance and Shareholder Unanimity: A New Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 685, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    21. Hans Ulrich Buhl & Björn Steven Häckel & Florian Probst & Josef Schosser, 2016. "On the Ex Ante Valuation of IT Service Investments," Business & Information Systems Engineering: The International Journal of WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK, Springer;Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. (GI), vol. 58(6), pages 415-432, December.
    22. Bosshardt, Donald I., 2003. "Capital structure, investment unanimity, and public goods: the case for social responsibility," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 239-260.
    23. John Thanassoulis, 2013. "Short-Term Shareholders, Bubbles, And CEO Myopia," Economics Series Working Papers 663, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    24. Jonathan M. Karpoff, 2021. "On a stakeholder model of corporate governance," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 321-343, June.

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