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Political Social Learning: Short-Term Memory and Cycles of Polarization

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  • Gilat Levy
  • Ronny Razin

Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of voters' short-term memory on political outcomes by considering politics as a collective learning process. We find that short-term memory may lead to cycles of polarization and consensus across parties' platforms. Following periods of party consensus, short-term memory implies that there is little variation in voters' data and therefore limited information about the true state of the world. This in turn allows parties to further their own interests and hence polarize by offering different policies. In contrast, periods of polarization and turnover involve sufficient variation in the data that allows voters to be confident about what the correct policy is, forcing both parties to offer this policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, 2025. "Political Social Learning: Short-Term Memory and Cycles of Polarization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 115(2), pages 635-659, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:115:y:2025:i:2:p:635-59
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220226
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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