IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v114y2024i12p3847-76.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Aiming for the Goal: Contribution Dynamics of Crowdfunding

Author

Listed:
  • Joyee Deb
  • Aniko Öry
  • Kevin R. Williams

Abstract

We study a dynamic contribution game where investors seek private benefits offered in exchange for contributions, and a single, publicly minded donor values project success. We show that donor contributions serve as costly signals that encourage socially productive contributions by investors who face a coordination problem. Investors and the donor prefer different equilibria, but all benefit in expectation from the donor's ability to dynamically signal his valuation. We explore various contexts in which our model can be applied and delve empirically into the case of Kickstarter. We calibrate our model and quantify the coordination benefits of dynamic signaling in counterfactuals.

Suggested Citation

  • Joyee Deb & Aniko Öry & Kevin R. Williams, 2024. "Aiming for the Goal: Contribution Dynamics of Crowdfunding," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(12), pages 3847-3876, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:114:y:2024:i:12:p:3847-76
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181851
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20181851
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.60600/YU/ZTFKYM
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20181851.appx
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20181851.ds
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1257/aer.20181851?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D26 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Crowd-Based Firms
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:114:y:2024:i:12:p:3847-76. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.