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The Political Economy of International Regulatory Cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Giovanni Maggi
  • Ralph Ossa

Abstract

We examine international regulatory agreements that are negotiated under lobbying pressures from producer groups. The way in which lobbying influences the cooperative setting of regulatory policies, as well as the welfare impacts of international agreements, depend crucially on whether the interests of producers in different countries are aligned or in conflict. The former situation tends to occur for product standards, while the latter tends to occur for process standards. We find that, if producer lobbies are strong enough, agreements on product standards lead to excessive deregulation and decrease welfare, while agreements on process standards tighten regulations and enhance welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Maggi & Ralph Ossa, 2023. "The Political Economy of International Regulatory Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(8), pages 2168-2200, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:113:y:2023:i:8:p:2168-2200
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200780
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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