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The Bidder's Curse: Comment*

* This paper is a replication of an original study

Author

Listed:
  • Henry S. Schneider

Abstract

The prices of auctions on eBay often exceed eBay's fixed-price "Buy- It-Now" prices. I investigate the causes of this overbidding, focusing on the interpretation in Malmendier and Lee (2011) that the observed overbidding cannot be explained "without allowing for nonstandard preferences or beliefs" and that the "strongest direct evidence points to limited attention." Using data from their study and new data from eBay, I provide evidence that a key condition for identifying nonstandard behavior may not have been met, and that the observed overbidding is not inconsistent with standard behavior once we allow for the likely presence of search costs. (JEL D12, D44, D83)

Suggested Citation

  • Henry S. Schneider, 2016. "The Bidder's Curse: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(4), pages 1182-1194, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:4:p:1182-94
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20120767
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dominic Coey & Bradley J. Larsen & Brennan C. Platt, 2020. "Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(12), pages 3748-3785, December.
    2. Ulrike Malmendier, 2016. "The Bidder's Curse: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(4), pages 1195-1213, April.
    3. Backus, Matthew R. & Podwol, Joseph Uri & Schneider, Henry S., 2014. "Search costs and equilibrium price dispersion in auction markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 173-192.
    4. Freeman, David J. & Kimbrough, Erik O. & Reiss, J. Philipp, 2020. "Opportunity cost, inattention and the bidder’s curse," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    5. Florian Englmaier & Arno Schmöller & Till Stowasser, 2018. "Price Discontinuities in an Online Market for Used Cars," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(6), pages 2754-2766, June.
    6. Fabian Ocker, 2018. "“Bid more, pay less” – overbidding and the Bidder’s curse in teleshopping auctions," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 28(4), pages 491-508, November.
    7. Podwol, Joseph Uri & Schneider, Henry S., 2016. "Nonstandard bidder behavior in real-world auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 198-212.

    Replication

    This item is a replication of:
  • Ulrike Malmendier & Young Han Lee, 2011. "The Bidder's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 749-787, April.

    • More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Lists

    This item is featured on the following reading lists, Wikipedia, or ReplicationWiki pages:
    1. The Bidder's Curse: Comment (AER 2016) in ReplicationWiki

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