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Debt Contracts with Partial Commitment

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  • Natalia Kovrijnykh

Abstract

This paper analyzes a dynamic lending relationship where the borrower cannot be forced to make repayments, and the lender offers long-term contracts that are imperfectly enforced and repeatedly renegotiated. No commitment and full commitment by the lender are special cases of this model where the probability of enforcement equals zero and one, respectively. I show that an increase in the degree of enforcement can lower social welfare. Furthermore, properties of equilibrium investment dynamics with partial commitment drastically differ from those with full and no commitment. In particular, investment is positively related to cash flow, consistent with empirical findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Natalia Kovrijnykh, 2013. "Debt Contracts with Partial Commitment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(7), pages 2848-2874, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:103:y:2013:i:7:p:2848-74
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.7.2848
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Onur Ozgur, 2005. "A Model of Dynamic Liquidity Contracts," Microeconomics 0502004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Stephane Verani, 2018. "Aggregate Consequences of Dynamic Credit Relationships," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 29, pages 44-67, July.
    3. Ales, Laurence & Maziero, Pricila & Yared, Pierre, 2014. "A theory of political and economic cycles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 224-251.
    4. Zachary Bethune & Tai-Wei Hu & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2018. "Optimal Credit Cycles," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 27, pages 231-245, January.
    5. Phoebe Tian, 2024. "The Role of Long-Term Contracting in Business Lending," Staff Working Papers 24-2, Bank of Canada.
    6. Thomas, Jonathan P. & Worrall, Tim, 2018. "Dynamic relational contracts under complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 624-651.
    7. Jean Guillaume Forand & Jan Zapal, 2017. "The Demand and Supply of Favours in Dynamic Relationships," Working Papers 1705, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2017.
    8. Alexander Karaivanov & Fernando Martin, 2015. "Dynamic Optimal Insurance and Lack of Commitment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(2), pages 287-305, April.
    9. Fiocco, Raffaele & Guo, Dongyu, 2020. "Regulatory risk, vertical integration, and upstream investment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    10. Thomas, Jonathan P. & Worrall, Tim, 2014. "Dynamic Relational Contracts under Complete Information," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-47, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    11. Michael R. Roberts, 2014. "The Role of Dynamic Renegotiation and Asymmetric Information in Financial Contracting," NBER Working Papers 20484, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Jonathan P Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2010. "Dynamic Relational Contracts with Credit Constraints," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1009, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    13. Roberts, Michael R., 2015. "The role of dynamic renegotiation and asymmetric information in financial contracting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 61-81.
    14. Breig, Zachary, 2019. "Endogenous and exogenous commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.
    15. Stephane Verani, 2018. "Aggregate Consequences of Dynamic Credit Relationships," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 29, pages 44-67, July.
    16. Barbos, Andrei, 2019. "Dynamic contracts with random monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-16.
    17. Shiv Dixit, 2023. "Contract Enforcement and Preventive Healthcare: Theory and Evidence," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 51, pages 1048-1094, December.
    18. Breig, Zachary, 2022. "Repeated contracting without commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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