IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/adr/anecst/y2009i93-94p135-160.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Mutual Monitoring vs. Incentive Pay in Teams

Author

Listed:
  • Radoslawa Nikolowa

Abstract

Agents who work in teams may be better informed about each other's effort than the employer. We analyse how the possibility for employees to write contracts on this information alters the incentives provided by the principal. We show that side-contracting is profitable for the employer when agents are well informed and hardly constrained by a limited liability. Furthermore, we show that mutual monitoring dominates unilateral supervision for high values of the monitoring cost.

Suggested Citation

  • Radoslawa Nikolowa, 2009. "Mutual Monitoring vs. Incentive Pay in Teams," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 93-94, pages 135-160.
    • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2009:i:93-94:p:135-160
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27917387
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2009:i:93-94:p:135-160. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Secretariat General or Laurent Linnemer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ensaefr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.