IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/adr/anecst/y1999i54p247-267.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Négociations et espérance d'utilité dépendante du rang

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Max Koskievic

Abstract

The Axiomatic bargaining theory (Nash [1950]) has been developed in the Expected Utility (EU) Paradigm. Nevertheless in this latter, two bargainers with the same marginal utility must have the same risk aversion and therefore the same bargaining power. We show that, when the Risk Preferences are non-EU, the bargaining power depends on the intensity of the agent's certainty effect (measured by the derivative at the point one of his probability perception function).

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Max Koskievic, 1999. "Négociations et espérance d'utilité dépendante du rang," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 54, pages 247-267.
    • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1999:i:54:p:247-267
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20076185
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1999:i:54:p:247-267. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Secretariat General or Laurent Linnemer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ensaefr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.