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L'impact de la négociation et des prises de contrôles sur l'ampleur de l'effet de cliquet

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  • Gilles Chemla

Abstract

This paper considers a long-term relationship between a firm and a privately informed trading partner, say a buyer, when both parties bargain over a price in each period and when a takeover may take place. When takeovers are ruled out, having high bargaining power increases the firm's likelihood to exploit information previously revealed by the buyer in subsequent contract offers. This decreases the price which the firm can offer to induce the buyer to reveal his type. The possibility of a takeover by a raider with a bargaining power higher than the incumbent manager's increases the cost of information revelation to the buyer. This in turn leads the incumbent manager either to further decrease the price she charges to induce information revelation or to charge a semi-separating price, in which case the takeover is less likely to take place. In contrast, in the durable good monopolist case, information revelation decreases expected future profits and hence the incentive for takeover so that the possibility of takeover favors information revelation. (JEL D42, D82, G32, L14).

Suggested Citation

  • Gilles Chemla, 1999. "L'impact de la négociation et des prises de contrôles sur l'ampleur de l'effet de cliquet," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 54, pages 157-171.
    • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1999:i:54:p:157-171
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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