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Choix de capacités et comportements stratégiques

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  • Thierry Penard

Abstract

This paper tries to give a theoretical foundation to the idea that symmetric markets are more collusive than asymmetric markets. To prove this idea, we use a non cooperative repeated game in which firms choose their capacities in a first stage and then compete infinitely in price in a second stage. We characterise the optimal choices of capacities at the equilibrium. We conclude on the antitrust policy lessons of these results.

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Penard, 1997. "Choix de capacités et comportements stratégiques," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 46, pages 203-224.
    • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1997:i:46:p:203-224
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    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20076074
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    Cited by:

    1. Emilie Dargaud, 2008. "Mergers, cartels and leniency programs : the role of production capacities," Working Papers 0814, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    2. Federico Boffa & Carlo Scarpa, 2009. "An Anticompetitive Effect of Eliminating Transport Barriers in Network Markets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 34(2), pages 115-133, March.

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