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Non Verifiability, Costly Renegotiation and Efficiency

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  • Jerry R. Green
  • Jean-Jacques Laffont

Abstract

We study the implications of the non verifiability of information for the allocation of resources and the bearing of risk in a two party relationship. We consider a two step approach. In step one the two parties define a non contingent contract which will be executed when the non verifiable information will become common knowledge of the two parties. In step two a costly exogenous bargaining process takes place. The main result is that with risk neutrality it is possible to induce the first best as a Nash equilibrium of the contract without having to renegotiate. A counter-example shows that the result does not extend to risk averse parties for which non verifiability of information will impede in general risk sharing.

Suggested Citation

  • Jerry R. Green & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1994. "Non Verifiability, Costly Renegotiation and Efficiency," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 36, pages 81-95.
    • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:36:p:81-95
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    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20075970
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    Cited by:

    1. Chaserant, Camille, 2007. "Les fondements incomplets de l’incomplétude : Une revue critique de la théorie des contrats incomplets," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 83(2), pages 227-253, juin.
    2. Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2013. "Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 473-501.
    3. Andreu, Enrique & Neven, Damien & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2023. "Price authority and information sharing with competing supply chains," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).

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