Governance and Value Appropriation in the Cocoa Bioeconomy at Amazonas

Objective: this article identifies the mechanisms that guide governance and determine the possibilities of appropriation of value (income) by extractive producers who participate in different value chains of the cocoa bioeconomy in Amazonas. Theoretical approach: transaction cost economics, with an emphasis on the relationships between the specific conditions of assets and bargaining power over the appropriation of value, represents the basis for the two theoretical propositions formulated. Methods: a qualitative approach to multiple case studies was used in two regions (Madeira and Juruá rivers), which are representative of the value chains of the cocoa bioeconomy in Amazonas. Secondary (documents) and primary (interviews and focus group) data were analyzed using thematic analysis. Results: in the commodity and specialty cocoa chains, differentiated relational governance mechanisms have been established, which configure the distribution of bargaining power between intermediaries and producers and consequently the ability of these agents to appropriate value. Conclusion: swaying bargaining power in favor of producers depends on the presence of specific assets positioned to their benefit. The higher the level of specific assets involved in the transaction in favor of extractivists, as occurs in the specialty cocoa chain, the greater their bargaining power tends to be and, consequently, their opportunity to appropriate value. Encouraging the creation of value chains based on specific assets that increase producers’ ability to appropriate income is imperative to achieve an inclusive bioeconomy in the Amazon.