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Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxes with No Commitment

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Author Info
Marcus Berliant (Washington University in St. Louis)
John Ledyard (California Institute of Technology)

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Abstract

We wish to study optimal dynamic nonlinear income taxes. Do real world taxes share some of their features? What policy prescriptions can be made? We study a two period model, where the consumers and government each have separate budget constraints in the two periods, so income cannot be transferred between periods. Labor supply in both periods is chosen by the consumers. The government has memory, so taxes in the first period are a function of first period labor income, while taxes in the second period are a function of both first and second period labor income. The government cannot commit to future taxes. Time consistency is thus imposed as a requirement. The main results of the paper show that time consistent incentive compatible two period taxes involve separation of types in the first period and a differentiated lump sum tax in the second period, provided that the discount rate is high or utility is separable between labor and consumption. In the natural extension of the Diamond (1998) model with quasi-linear utility functions to two periods, an equivalence of dynamic and static optimal taxes is demonstrated, and a necessary condition for the top marginal tax rate on first period income is found.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0403004.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 19 Mar 2004
Date of revision: 21 Jun 2005
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0403004

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 28
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Optimal Income Taxation; Time Consistency; Incentive Compatibility; Sequential Information Revelation; Optimal Dynamic Taxation;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Dagobert L. Brito & Jonathan H. Hamilton & Steven M. Slutsky & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1991. "Dynamic Optimal Income Taxation with Government Commitment," NBER Working Papers 3265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, January.
  3. Roberts, Kevin, 1984. "The Theoretical Limits of Redistribution," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(2), pages 177-95, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Berliant, Marcus & Page, Frank H, Jr, 2001. "Income Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods: Existence of an Optimum," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 771-84, May.
  6. Diamond, Peter A, 1998. "Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 83-95, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Brett, Craig, 2008. "The effects of population aging on optimal redistributive taxes in an overlapping generations model," MPRA Paper 8585, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alan Krause, 2008. "Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with Learning-by-Doing," Discussion Papers 08/08, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
  3. Narayana R Kocherlakota, 2005. "Advances in Dynamic Optimal Taxation," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000518, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Salvador Ball & Amedeo Spadaro, 2006. "Optimal nonlinear labor income taxation in dynamic economies," PSE Working Papers 2006-01, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2005. "Optimal Nonlinear Taxation of Income and Savings in a Two Class Economy," Working Papers 0525, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  6. Christopher Sleet & Sevin Yeltekin, 2006. "Credibility and endogenous societal discounting," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(3), pages 410-437, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2006. "Disability insurance and optimal income taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 13(6), pages 717-732, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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