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Dynamic Optimal Income Taxation with Government Commitment

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Author Info
Dagobert L. Brito
Jonathan H. Hamilton
Steven M. Slutsky
Joseph E. Stiglitz

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Abstract

The optimal income taxation problem has been extensively studied in one-period models. This paper analyzes optimal income taxation when consumers work for many periods. We also analyze what information, if any, that the government learns about abilities in one period can be used in later periods to attain more redistribution than in a one-period world. When the government must commit itself to future tax schedules, intertemporal nonstationarity of tax schedules could relax the self-selection constraints and lead to Pareto improvements. The effect of nonstationarity is analogous to that of randomization in one-period models. The use of information is limited since only a single lifetime self-selection constraint for each type of consumer exists. These results hold when individuals and the government have the same discount rates. The planner can make additional use of the information when individual and social rates of time discounting differ. In this case, the limiting tax schedule is a nondistorting one if the government has a lower discount rate than individuals.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 3265.

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Date of creation: Oct 1991
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3265

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  1. Sadka, Efraim, 1976. "On Income Distribution, Incentive Effects and Optimal Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(2), pages 261-67, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. John C. Fellingham & Young K. Kwon & D. Paul Newman, 1984. "Ex ante Randomization in Agency Models," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 290-301, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Richard J. Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1988. "Randomization with Asymmetric Information," NBER Working Papers 2507, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Guesnerie, Roger & Seade, Jesus, 1982. "Nonlinear pricing in a finite economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 157-179, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Brito, D.L. & Hamilton, J.H. & Slutsky, S.M. & Stiglitz, J.E., 1989. "Randomization In Optimal Income Tax Schedules," Papers 89-6, Florida - College of Business Administration.
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  7. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1985. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Working papers 397, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  8. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Salvador Balle & Amedeo Spadaro, 2006. "Optimal Nonlinear Labor Income Taxation in Dynamic Economies," Working Papers 19, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Marcus Berliant & John Ledyard, 2004. "Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxes with No Commitment," Public Economics 0403004, EconWPA, revised 21 Jun 2005. [Downloadable!]
  3. Robin Boadway & Nicolas Marceau, 1994. "Time inconsistency as a rationale for public unemployment insurance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 107-126, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Albanesi, Stefania & Sleet, Christopher, 2003. "Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 4006, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Juan Carlos Chavez-Martin del Campo, 2008. "On the design of an optimal transfer schedule with time inconsistent preferences," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 8(5), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  6. Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2006. "Disability insurance and optimal income taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 13(6), pages 717-732, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Robin Boadway, 1998. "The Mirrlees Approach to the Theory of Economic Policy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 67-81, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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