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Integration and Independent Innovation on a Network

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Author Info
Joseph Farrell (Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley)

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Abstract

Physical telecom networks are costly and few, traditionally to the point of monopoly. Innovation thrives with many independent minds. So one might hope independent innovators, not only its proprietor M, can offer innovative services on a network, as has been true on the Internet. This issue is central in telecom policy; it also arises elsewhere, including complaints about Microsoft. I try to expound the following key points. Often an unregulated M has ex ante incentives to organize service innovation efficiently. But this incentive breaks down ex post as M can extract an independent J's quasi-rents (Farrell and Michael Katz 2000). Even ex ante, the "one monopoly rent theorem" (Ward Bowman 1957) fails when M's bottleneck access business is more regulated than its competitive services (e.g., Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole 2000). This tempts M to sabotage J's innovations. "Quarantining" M from the service sector solves these problems, but excludes the firm with (often) the best opportunities and the strongest incentives to innovate. "Parity pricing" or ECPR (Robert Willig 1979) purports to get the best of both worlds (BoBW). But it seems so hard to implement in innovation markets that one might construe ECPR analysis as reductio ad absurdum for BoBW.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Industrial Organization with number 0401002.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 08 Jan 2004
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0401002

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
O3 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change
L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Joseph Farrell and Michael L. Katz., 2000. "Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets," Economics Working Papers E00-286, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, 1995. "Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the Efficient Component Pricing Rule?," Working Papers 95-04, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509, January.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Pollock, R., 2009. "The Economics of Public Sector Information," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0920, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
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