We consider a local interaction model with a population on an h dimensional torus, in which in each round of play a random player gets a learning draw. This player plays a k+1 action stage game with players in his neighborhood, compares his own average payoff with the average payoff of the neighbors he played against and updates his action based on this comparison. Individuals use the update rule `Win Cooperate, Lose Defect', a multi-player variant of Tit-for-Tat. We prove that there are exactly k+1 stable states and that all of these can be reached with positive probability, for any dimension h of the torus. Furthermore, we prove that when k+1=2, both stable states will be reached with probability 1/2. For k+1>2 we provide some insight in the probability of reaching each of the stable states by presenting simulation results.
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Length: 27 pages Date of creation: 24 Mar 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9803002
Note: Type of Document - dvi (compiled TeX); prepared on IBM PC - Scientific Workplace 2.5; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 27 ; figures: included. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper Contact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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Giorgio Fagiolo & Luigi Marengo & Marco Valente, 2003.
"Endogenous Networks in Random Population Games,"
LEM Papers Series
2003/03, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
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