This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-1998-05-13 (All new papers)
• NEP-EVO-1998-05-13 (Evolutionary Economics)
• NEP-GTH-1998-05-13 (Game Theory)
• NEP-MIC-1998-05-13 (Microeconomics)

1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Kandori Michihiro & Rob Rafael, 1995. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 383-414, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Samuelson, L. & Zhang, J., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Papers 9132, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
   Other versions:
   • Samuelson, L., 1989. "Evolutionnary Stability In Asymmetric Games," Papers 11-8-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
   • Samuelson, L. & Zhang, J., 1990. "Evolutionary Stability In Symmetric Games," Working papers 90-24, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
4. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 1997. "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 235-265, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Schlag, Karl H., 1999. "Which one should I imitate?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 493-522, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Schlag, Karl H., 1996. "Which one should I imitate?," Discussion Paper Serie B 365, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
6. Tan, Tommy Chin-Chiu & da Costa Werlang, Sergio Ribeiro, 1988. "The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 370-391, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Sanchirico, Chris William, 1996. "A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1375-93, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Sanchirico, C.W., 1996. "A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games," Discussion Papers 1996_19, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
8. Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1991. "Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 141-146, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Basu, K. & Weibull, J., 1990. "Strategy Subsets Closed Under Rational Behavior," Papers 62, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
   • Basu, K. & Weibull, J.W., 1990. "Strategy Subsets Closed Under Rational Behaviour," Papers 479, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
9. Camerer, Colin, . "Progress and Behavioral Game Theory," Working Papers 1004, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
10. Fudenberg, D. & Harris, C., 1992. "Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 420-441, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Harris, Christopher, 1992. "Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks," IDEI Working Papers 13, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
11. Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 943-56, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • BERGINÊ, James & LIPMAN, Bart, 1994. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," CORE Discussion Papers 1994055, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
12. Camerer, Colin & Ho, Teck-Hua, 1997. "Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Games: A Unifying Approach," Working Papers 1003, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
13. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 476-496, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • van Damme,Eric, 1987. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie A 128, University of Bonn, Germany.
14. Selten, Reinhard, 1988. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 223-266, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Selten,Reinhard, 1986. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games correction and further development," Discussion Paper Serie A 70, University of Bonn, Germany.
15. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384.
16. Bomze Immanuel M. & Weibull Jorgen W., 1995. "Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 173-192, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1996. "Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 558-573, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jîrgen W., 1995. "Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9506, CEPREMAP.
18. Cross, John G, 1973. "A Stochastic Learning Model of Economic Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(2), pages 239-66, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. repec:att:wimass:199325 is not listed on IDEAS
20. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
22. Karl H. Schlag, . "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi- Armed Bandits," ELSE working papers 028, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits," Discussion Paper Serie B 361, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1996. [Downloadable!]
    • Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
24. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215.
25. Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1995. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1371-99, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
26. Binmore, Ken & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Discussion Paper Serie B 275, University of Bonn, Germany.
    Other versions:
    • Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Game Theory and Information 9410002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    • Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Muddling Through:Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Game Theory and Information 9403005, EconWPA, revised 29 Mar 1994. [Downloadable!]
27. Warneryd, Karl, 1991. "Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 375-378, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
28. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
29. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1990. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 274-79, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
30. Vincent P. Crawford, 1992. "Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionary Stability in Large and Finite Populations," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 25-26, pages 16, Janvier-J. [Downloadable!]
31. Schlag,Karl, . "Cheap talk and evolutionary dynamics," Discussion Paper Serie B 242, University of Bonn, Germany.
32. Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
33. Barry Sopher & Dilip Mookherjee, 1997. "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Departmental Working Papers 199527, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
    • Barry Sopher & Dilip Mookherjee, 2000. "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Departmental Working Papers 199625, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    • Mookherjee, Dilip & Sopher, Barry, 1997. "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 97-132, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
34. Boylan, Richard T., 1990. "Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals," Working Papers 748, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
35. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
36. repec:att:wimass:199324 is not listed on IDEAS
37. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Game Played by Finite Automata," Papers 9131, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    Other versions:
    • Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1990. "Evolutionary Stability In Repeated Games Played By Finite Automata," Working papers 90-29, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    • Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated games Played by Finite Automata," Papers 90-17, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
38. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
39. Bhaskar, V., 1998. "Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 110-131, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
40. Swinkels Jeroen M., 1993. "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 455-484, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1991. "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games," Discussion Papers 1001, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
41. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1991. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Working Papers 91-18, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 895, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    • Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1990. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 925, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    • Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-45, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
42. Hammerstein, Peter & Selten, Reinhard, 1994. "Game theory and evolutionary biology," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 28, pages 929-993 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
43. Vincent P. Crawford, 1990. "An 'Evolutionary' Interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Experimental Results on Coordination," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 89-28r, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    Other versions:
    • Crawford, Vincent P., 1991. "An "evolutionary" interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 25-59, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
44. Blume, Lawrence & Easley, David, 1992. "Evolution and market behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 9-40, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
45. repec:att:wimass:199518r is not listed on IDEAS
46. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
47. Noeldecke,Georg & Samuelson,Larry, . "An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 228, University of Bonn, Germany.
    Other versions:
    • Noldeke Georg & Samuelson Larry, 1993. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 425-454, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
48. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
49. Canning, D., 1990. "Social Equilibrium," Papers 150, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
50. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolution and strategic stability: From maynard smith to kohlberg and mertens," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 333-342, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
51. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
52. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 547-73, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 373, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
53. Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 180-210, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
54. Akihiko Matsui, 1989. "Cheap Talk and Cooperation in the Society," Discussion Papers 848, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
55. Kim, Yong-Gwan & Sobel, Joel, 1995. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1181-93, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Yong Gwan Kim & Joel Sobel, 1992. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-01, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    • Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," Working Papers 93-02, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
56. Mailath, George J., 1992. "Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 259-277, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
57. Boylan, Richard T., 1992. "Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 473-504, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
58. Vega-Redondo Fernando, 1995. "Expectations, Drift, and Volatility in Evolutionary Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 391-412, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
59. Cabrales, Antonio & Sobel, Joel, 1992. "On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 407-419, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Antonio Cabrales & Joel Sobel, 1991. "On the Limit Points of Discrete Selection Dynamics," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 91-28, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
60. Samuelson Larry, 1994. "Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative Best Replies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-65, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
61. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Swinkels, J., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability with Equilibrium Entrants," Papers 9, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
62. Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
63. Benaim, M. & Weibull, J.W., 2000. "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games," Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers 534, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
    Other versions:
    • Benaim, Michel & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2000. "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games," Working Paper Series 534, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 30 Oct 2001. [Downloadable!]
    • Michel BenaÔm & J–rgen W. Weibull, 2003. "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 873-903, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
64. Robson, Arthur J. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1996. "Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 65-92, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Arthur J Robson & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1999. "Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2112, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
65. Borgers, Tilman & Sarin, Rajiv, 1997. "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 1-14, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Tilman Borgers & Rajiv Sarin, 1993. "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 93-47, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
66. Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 547-575, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Blume, A. & Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1992. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Working Papers 92-17, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
    • Andreas Blume & Yong-Gwan Kim & Joel Sobel, 1992. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-29, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    • Blume, A. & Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Working Papers 93-07, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
67. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
68. Abhijit Banerjee & Jörgen W. Weibull, . "Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap Talk Coordination Games," ELSE working papers 012, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    Other versions:
    • Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jorgen W., 2000. "Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
69. Dekel, Eddie & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1992. "On the evolution of optimizing behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 392-406, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
70. Camerer, Colin F, 1997. "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 167-88, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
71. Cabrales, Antonio, 2000. "Stochastic Replicator Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(2), pages 451-81, May.
    Other versions:
    • Antonio Cabrales, 1993. "Stochastic Replicator Dynamics," Economics Working Papers 54, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
72. Valentina Corradi & Rajiv Sarin, . "Continuous Approximations of Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics," ELSE working papers 002, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
73. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
74. Gilboa, Itzhak & Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 859-67, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
75. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1991. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium ," Working papers 581, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
    • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2147, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-45, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
76. Foellmer,Hans Sondermann,Dieter, 1985. "Hedging of non-redundant contingent claims," Discussion Paper Serie B 3, University of Bonn, Germany.
77. Schlag,Karl, . "Dynamic stability in the repeated prisoners dilemma," Discussion Paper Serie B 243, University of Bonn, Germany.
78. Selten, Reinhard, 1991. "Evolution, learning, and economic behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 3-24, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Selten,Reinhard, . "Evolution,learning and economic behaviour," Discussion Paper Serie B 132, University of Bonn, Germany.
79. Noldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1997. "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 118-156, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Noeldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1996. "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Economics Series 27, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
    • Gerorg Nöldeke & Larry Samuelson, . "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection In Signaling Markets," ELSE working papers 038, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]

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1. Kris De Jaegher & Marc Jegers, 2001. "The physician-patient relationship as a game of strategic information transmission," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(7), pages 651-668. [Downloadable!]
2. Camerer, Colin & Ho, Teck-Hua, 1997. "Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Games: A Unifying Approach," Working Papers 1003, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
3. Stepan Cabelka & Jacek Cukrowski, 2001. "R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Evolution and Aspiration Learning," Industrial Organization 0012005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]