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Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium

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Author Info
John Hillas (SUNY at Stony Brook)
Elon Kohlberg (Harvard)
Abstract

The central concept of noncooperative game theory is that of the \emph{strategic equilibrium} (or Nash equilibrium, or noncooperative equilibrium). In this chapter we discuss some of the conceptual issues surrounding this concept and its refinements. Many of these issues have received increasing attention in the last few years. We are not at all comprehensive in covering the approaches that have been taken to the question. In particular, we focus almost exclusively on the ``purely rational'' approach and say almost nothing about other approaches. We do survey some of the issues and approaches that do not fit neatly into the core of our argument in the final section.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9606002.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 2 pages
Date of creation: 30 Jun 1996
Date of revision: 18 Sep 1996
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9606002

Note: Type of Document - AMS LaTeX; prepared on IBM PC - emTEX ; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 2 + 63; figures: included . Prepared for the \emph{Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications} edited by Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart. Comments still welcomed by the authors, perhaps not by the editors. Postscript file redone embedding type 1 versions of the fonts, in the hope that a dpf file will be generated and the postsctipt file made directly available.
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Related research
Keywords: strategic equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; strategic stability; equilibrium refinements;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1996. "Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 178-200, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384.
  4. Basu, Kaushik, 1988. "Strategic irrationality in extensive games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 247-260, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. repec:nys:sunysb:91-24 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. DHILLON, Amrita & MERTENS, Jean-Franois, 1992. "Perfect correlated equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 1992039, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    Other versions:
  8. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Universal Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1341-64, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. GOVINDAN, Srihari, 1992. "Stability and the chain store paradox," CORE Discussion Papers 1992004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Brandenburger, Adam, 1992. "Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 83-101, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 81-98, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. John Hillas & Dries Vermeulen & Mathijs Jansen, 1996. "On the Finiteness of Stable Sets," Game Theory and Information 9605003, EconWPA, revised 15 Jun 1996. [Downloadable!]
  14. Blume, Lawrence E & Zame, William R, 1994. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 783-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Borgers Tilman, 1994. "Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 265-276, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Cho, In-Koo & Sobel, Joel, 1990. "Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-413, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1996. "Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 201-234, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Elmes Susan & Reny Philip J., 1994. "On the Strategic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-23, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  21. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1986. " Axiomatic Characterizations of Rational Choice in Strategic Environme nts," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 88(3), pages 473-88.
  22. Van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Strategic equilibrium," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 41, pages 1521-1596 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Mailath, George J & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M, 1993. "Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 273-302, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  25. Basu, Kaushik, 1990. "On the Non-existence of a Rationality Definition for Extensive Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 33-44.
  26. Mertens, J.-F., 1987. "Ordinality in non cooperative games," CORE Discussion Papers 1987028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    Other versions:
  27. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 61-79, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. John Hillas, 1996. "On the Relation Between Perfect Equilibria in Extensive Form Games and Proper Equilibria in Normal Form Games," Game Theory and Information 9605002, EconWPA, revised 14 May 1996. [Downloadable!]
  30. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  31. Noldeke Georg & Samuelson Larry, 1993. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 425-454, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  32. Hart, Sergiu, 1992. "Games in extensive and strategic forms," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 19-40 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  33. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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