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Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements

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Author Info
Blume, Lawrence
Brandenburger, Adam
Dekel, Eddie

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Abstract

This paper develops a decision-theoretic approach to normal-form refinements of Nash equilibrium and provides characterizations of (normal-form) perfect equilibrium and proper equilibrium. The approach relies on a theory of single-person decision-making that is a non-Archimedean version of subjective expected utility theory. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 59 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 81-98
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:59:y:1991:i:1:p:81-98

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  1. Peter J. Hammond, 1997. "Non-Archimedean Subjective Probabilities in Decision Theory and Games," Working Papers 97038, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Geir B. Asheim, 2000. "Proper Consistency," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0193, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Shurojit Chatterji & Srihari Govindan, 2002. "Message Spaces for Perfect Correlated Equilibria," Working Papers 0207, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
  4. Matthew Ryan, 2001. "Capacity Updating Rules and Rational Belief Change," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 73-87, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2000. "Amissibility and Common Belief," Research Papers in Economics 2000:6, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2001. "Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7571, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008. "On Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001859, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996. [Downloadable!]
  9. Penta, Antonio, 2004. "Perfect Sequential Reciprocity and Dynamic Consistency," MPRA Paper 10261, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2007. [Downloadable!]
  10. Elyès Jouini & Hédi Kallal, 1999. "Efficient Trading Strategies in the Presence of Market Frictions," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-035, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Nash Equilibrium without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality," Working Papers ecpap-95-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006. "Sufficient Conditions for Stable Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000267, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memoranda 047, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  14. Joseph Halpern, 2009. "A nonstandard characterization of sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, and proper equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 37-49, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Lawrence E. Blume & William R. Zame, 1993. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9309001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Antonio Quesada, 2003. "Negative results in the theory of games with lexicographic utilities," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(20), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  17. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
  18. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Memorandum 30/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Proper Rationalizability and Belief Revision in Dynamic Games," Research Memoranda 048, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  20. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2008. "Decision-Theoretic Forward Induction," Research Papers 1986, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
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