This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Political alternation as a restraint on investing in influence : evidence from the post-communist transition

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Milanovic, Branko
Hoff, Karla
Horowitz, Shale

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The authors develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. The authors find that more frequent alternation in power is associated with the emergence of better governance in post communist countries. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms seek durable protection from the state, which implies that expected political alternation is relevant to the decision whether to invest in influence with the governing party or, alternatively, to demand institutions that apply predictable rules, with equality of treatment, regardless of the party in power.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/10/06/000158349_20081006082731/Rendered/PDF/WPS4747.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 4747.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4747

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Email:
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).

Related research
Keywords: National Governance; Governance Indicators; Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures; Parliamentary Government; Emerging Markets;

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Daniel Lederman & Norman V. Loayza & Rodrigo R. Soares, 2005. "Accountability And Corruption: Political Institutions Matter," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17, pages 1-35, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2002. "The Political Economy Of Government Responsiveness: Theory And Evidence From India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1415-1451, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Avinash Dixit & Gene M. Grossman & Faruk Gul, 2000. "The Dynamics of Political Compromise," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(3), pages 531-568, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Irina Slinko & Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia," Economics Working Papers 0046, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, Thierry, 2006. "Political foundations of the resource curse," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 447-468, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Yingyi Qian, 1999. "The Institutional Foundations of China's Market Transition," Working Papers 99011, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Hoff, Karla & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2002. "After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post-communist societies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2934, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Hellman, Joel S. & Jones, Geraint & Kaufmann, Daniel, 2003. "Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 751-773, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Murshed, S. Mansoob, 2004. "When Does Natural Resource Abundance Lead to a Resource Curse?," Discussion Papers 24137, International Institute for Environment and Development, Environmental Economics Programme. [Downloadable!]
  10. Robert H. Bates, 2004. "On The Politics of Property Rights by Haber, Razo, and Maurer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 494-500, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," NBER Working Papers 0110, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Gradstein, Mark & Milanovic, Branko & Ying, Yvonne, 2001. "Democracy and income inequality : an empirical analysis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2561, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Campos, Nauro F & Giovannoni, Francesco, 2006. "Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence," CEPR Discussion Papers 5886, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Campos, Nauro F. & Giovannoni, Francesco, 2008. "Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes," IZA Discussion Papers 3693, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Each page is provided with a technical contact, in case something is not right with the supplied information. See under "publisher info".

This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.