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Evaluating recipes for development success

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Author Info
Dixit, Avinash

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Abstract

This paper provides a review of the contradictions and conflicts in the literature on economic governance and sketches an approach to use some of the conceptual and empirical findings from that literature for development policy. The literature offers conflicting conclusions on big questions: whether history and geography preordain a country's economic fate, whether democracy or authoritarianism promotes growth; whether informal or formal mechanisms are best; whether"big bang"or gradual transitions promote growth; and whether disasters and demographics are stumbling blocks or stepping stones. The author finds recipes for success that are infeasible, contradictory and shifting, and that ignore the role of luck in development policy. While the researcher may ask,"What creates success on average across countries?"the policymaker needs to know,"What is going wrong in this country and how can we put it right?"The author suggests a preliminary approach to combine the practitioner's detailed knowledge of country conditions with the broader patterns uncovered by scholars, building on"growth diagnostics"that identify binding constraints to development. But he shifts from the sequential"decision tree"framework to a more directly"diagnostic"approach that recognizes that policymakers must deal with many factors simultaneously. The framework he suggests combines empirical information on potential causes, estimates of their probabilities, and observed effects. He proposes this framework as the foundation, not for another recipe, but for a broader mode of thought to tackle the complexity and variance in development processes and patterns across countries and time-one country at a time.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3859.

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Date of creation: 01 Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3859

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Keywords: Governance Indicators; National Governance; Children and Youth; Economic Theory&Research; Economic Policy; Institutions and Governance;

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  7. Dixit, Avinash, 1992. "Investment and Hysteresis," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 107-32, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Baker, George & Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1994. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1125-56, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. McCarthy, F. Desmond & Bader, William & Pleskovic, Boris, 2003. "Creating partnerships for capacity building in developing countries - the experience of the World Bank," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3099, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  18. Islam, Roumeen, 2003. "do more transparent government govern better?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3077, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  20. Bernstein, Lisa, 1992. "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 115-57, January.
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  24. Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart, 2002. "Growth without governance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2928, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Klump, Rainer & Pruefer, Patricia, 2006. "Prioritizing policies for pro-poor growth: applying bayesian model averaging to Vietnam," Discussion Paper 117, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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