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Fiscal constraints, collection costs, and trade policies

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Author Info
Kubota, Keiko

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Abstract

That free trade allows economies in an ideal world to achieve the greatest possible welfare is one of the few undisputed propositions in economics. In reality, however, free trade is rare. The author argues that many developing countries intervene in trade at least partly to raise revenues, and that episodes of trade liberalization are often linked to tax reform. The author proposes a formal model to explain why developing countries rely disproportionately on tariffs for government revenues, when tax reforms are expected, and under what conditions trade liberalization will take place. The model uses the simple concept of the fixed costs involved in tax collection. When fiscal needs are limited, and the infrastructure to monitor, administer, and collect taxes is not well-developed, it is optimal for governments to rely on a handful of easy-to-collect taxes, which generally includes trade taxes. When fiscal needs expand, theexcess burden on the tax base grows rapidly, and tax reform becomes necessary. Tax reforms reduce reliance on the existing tax base, often allowing the statutory tax rate to be lowered. This is a form of trade liberalization when it involves the trade sector. The author defines trade liberalization in a somewhat unconventional way: only reductions in the rates at which the trade sector is taxed, are considered trade liberalization. Tariffication of quotas, normally considered a form of trade liberalization, is treated as tax reform (expanding the tax base). The author tests this hypothesis empirically, first through three historic case studies (Bolivia, Jamaica, and Morocco) and then through systematic econometric analysis. She constructs a set of panel data for 38 developing countries for 1980-92, using the statutory tariff rates published by UNCTAD. She uses empirical tests to isolate the cause of trade liberalization. The results support her hypothesis: tariff rates are positively related to fiscal shocks, and negatively associated with episodes of tax reform.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 2366.

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Date of creation: 30 Jun 2000
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2366

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Keywords: Banks&Banking Reform; Environmental Economics&Policies; Public Sector Economics&Finance; Economic Theory&Research; Municipal Financial Management; Environmental Economics&Policies; Public Sector Economics&Finance; Economic Theory&Research; TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT; National Governance;

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. McLaren, John, 1998. "Black Markets and Optimal Evadable Taxation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 665-79, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Pritchett, Lant & Sethi, Geeta, 1994. "Tariff Rates, Tariff Revenue, and Tariff Reform: Some New Facts," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 1-16, January.
    Other versions:
  3. James E. Anderson, 1997. "Trade Reform with a Government Budget Constraint," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 348., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Abe, Kenzo, 1995. "The Target Rates of Tariff and Tax Reform," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(4), pages 875-85, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Heady, Christopher J. & Mitra, Pradeep K., 1987. "Distributional and revenue raising arguments for tariffs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 77-101, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Clarete, Ramon L. & Whalley, John, 1987. "Comparing the marginal welfare costs of commodity and trade taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 357-362, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Sandmo, Agnar, 1976. "Optimal taxation : An introduction to the literature," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 37-54. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Cassing, James H. & Hillman, Arye L., 1985. "Political influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 279-290, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Baack, Bennett D. & Ray, Edward John, 1983. "The political economy of tariff policy: A case study of the United States," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 73-93, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Cukierman, Alex & Edwards, Sebastian & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "Seigniorage and Political Instability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 537-55, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1979. "A Note on Optimal Taxation and Administrative Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(3), pages 475-80, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Dixit, Avinash, 1985. "Tax policy in open economies," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 313-374 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Peter A. Diamond & J. A. Mirrlees, 1968. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production," Working papers 22, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  16. Mitra, Pradeep, 1992. "The Coordinated Reform of Tariffs and Indirect Taxes," World Bank Research Observer, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 195-218, July.
  17. Jay Pil Choi, 1996. "A Rationale for Quota Protection: A Political Economy Approach," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 22(4), pages 421-424, Fall. [Downloadable!]
  18. Currie, Janet & Harrison, Ann E, 1997. "Sharing the Costs: The Impact of Trade Reform on Capital and Labor in Morocco," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(3), pages S44-71, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. repec:bep:glecon:6:2007:3:2 is not listed on IDEAS
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  2. Xenia Matschke, 2005. "Costly Revenue-Raising and the Case for Favoring Import-Competing Industries," Working papers 2005-28, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Michael E. S. Hoffman, 2005. "Political and Public Finance Motives for Tariffs," International Trade 0510016, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. M. Shahe Emran & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2002. "On Selective Indirect Tax Reform in Developing Countries," International Trade 0210003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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