Market power of workers on wages is bound to affect economic performances. This paper focuses on this issue and analyse the influence of bargaining structures on growth and labor market functioning. To achieve this, we construct an endogenous growth model where growth appears as the result of a learning-by-doing process whereas imperfect information in the labor market implies matching frictions in the hiring process. If investment occurs before wage bargaining, the growth process can be durably altered. In this case, a higher bargaining power of worker does not give a clear-cut effect on growth.
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Paper provided by Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of BETA with number
2009-03.
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