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Competing Premarital Investment Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Michael Peters
Aloysius Siow
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This paper studies pre-marital parental investments in their chil- dren's wealth where spousal wealth is a public good in marriage. By investing in their children's wealth, parents increase the wealth of their children and the quality of the spouses that their children can marry. In large marriage markets, the hedonic return to investment internal- izes all the external benefits of pre-marital investment in wealth so that the competitive equilibrium is efficient. Marriage market compe- tition also increases investments in small marriage markets relative to no competition, but equilibrium investments are not efficient.
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Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
peters-01-02.
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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 21 Mar 2001Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:peters-01-02Contact details of provider: Postal: 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario Phone: (416) 978-5283 Fax: (416) 978-6713
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