Miriam Steurer () (School of Economics, The University of New South Wales)
Abstract
A two-stage bargaining model is developed to describe how fertility decisions are made in a strategic family setting. Given the assumption that family contracts are incomplete and cannot be used to enforce optimal behavior, it is shown that investments in children (i.e. the fertility rate) may be sub-optimal. This is because the woman may find it in her interest to invest too little in children in stage 1 of the model in order to protect her bargaining status in stage 2. I then consider in the context of this model the impact on fertility rates of changes in child custody rules (in the case of divorce), the wage rate, and the male-female wage differential. I conclude by exploring how the introduction of child subsidies can change the results.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by School of Economics, The University of New South Wales in its series Discussion Papers with number
2009-04.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
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