This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2006-06-17 (All new papers)
• NEP-BEC-2006-06-17 (Business Economics)
• NEP-CFN-2006-06-17 (Corporate Finance)
• NEP-COM-2006-06-17 (Industrial Competition)
• NEP-MIC-2006-06-17 (Microeconomics)
• NEP-UPT-2006-06-17 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)

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2. Erkan YalÁin & Thomas I. Renstr–m, 2003. "Endogenous Firm Objectives," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(1), pages 67-94, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. repec:rus:hseeco:72155 is not listed on IDEAS
4. Dierker, Egbert & Grodal, Birgit, 1996. "Profit Maximization Mitigates Competition," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 139-60, January.
5. Frank Milne & David Kelsey, 2005. "Externalities, Monopoly and the Objective Function of the Firm," Working Papers 1078, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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   • David Kelsey & Frank Milne, 2006. "Externalities, monopoly and the objective function of the firm," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 565-589, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1999. "Corporate Governance and Competition," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 99-28, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
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12. Farrell, Joseph, 1985. "Owner-consumers and efficiency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 303-306. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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13. Nabil Al-Najjar & Sandeep Baliga & David Besanko, 2005. "The Sunk Cost Bias and Managerial Pricing Practices," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000496, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    • Nabil Al-Najjar & Sandeep Baliga & David Besanko, 2006. "The Sunk Cost Bias and Managerial Pricing Practices," 2006 Meeting Papers 851, Society for Economic Dynamics.
14. Sadanand, Asha B & Williamson, John M, 1991. "Equilibrium in a Stock Market Economy with Shareholder Voting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(1), pages 1-35, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Petra Geraats & Hans Haller, 1998. "Shareholders' choice," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 68(2), pages 111-135, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Kelsey, David & Milne, Frank, 1996. "The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 229-245. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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19. Becht, Marco & Bolton, Patrick & Roell, Ailsa, 2003. "Corporate governance and control," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-109 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Patrick Bolton & Marco Becht & Alisa Roell, 2002. "Corporate Governance and Control," NBER Working Papers 9371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Baye, Michael R & Crocker, Keith J & Ju, Jiandong, 1996. "Divisionalization, Franchising, and Divestiture Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 223-36, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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1. Frank Milne & David Kelsey, 2005. "Externalities, Monopoly and the Objective Function of the Firm," Working Papers 1078, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • David Kelsey & Frank Milne, 2006. "Externalities, monopoly and the objective function of the firm," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 565-589, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Stefano Demichelis & Klaus Ritzberger, 2007. "Corporate Control and the Stock Market," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 60, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]