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General Game Playing B-to-B Price Negotiations

Author

Listed:
  • Michael, Friedrich
  • Ignatov, Dmitry I.

Abstract

This papers discusses the scientific and practical perspectives of using general game playing in business-to-business price negotiations as a part of Procurement 4.0 revolution. The status quo of digital price negotiations software,which emerged from intuitive solutions to business goals and refereed to as electronic auctions in industry, is summarized in scientific context. Description of such aspects as auctioneers’ interventions, asymmetry among players and time-depended features reveals the nature of nowadays electronic auctions to be rather termed as price games. This paper strongly suggests general game playing as the crucial technology for automation of human rule setting in those games. Game theory, genetic programming, experimental economics and AI human player simulation are also discussed as satellite topics. SIDL-type game descriptions languages and their formal game theoretic foundations are presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael, Friedrich & Ignatov, Dmitry I., 2019. "General Game Playing B-to-B Price Negotiations," MPRA Paper 97313, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Sep 2019.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:97313
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/97313/1/project2.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Procurement 4.0; Artificial Intelligence; General Game Playing; Game Theory; Mechanism Design; Experimental Economics; Behavioral Eco-nomics; z-Tree; Cognitive Modeling; e-Auctions; barter double auction; B-to-B Price Negotiations; English Auction; Dutch auction; Sealed-Bid Auction; Industry 4.0;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D04 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Policy: Formulation; Implementation; Evaluation
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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