This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2004-07-04 (All new papers)
• NEP-COM-2004-07-04 (Industrial Competition)
• NEP-EXP-2004-07-04 (Experimental Economics)

1. W. Güth & R. Ivanova-Stenzel & M. Königstein & M. Strobel, . "Learning to Bid-An Experimental Study of Bid Function Adjustments in Auctions and Fair Division Games," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1999-70, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
   Other versions:
   • Werner G¸th & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Manfred K–nigstein & Martin Strobel, 2003. "Learning to bid - an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(487), pages 477-494, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384.
3. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Goeree, Jacob & Holt, Charles, 2000. "Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-value Auctions," Working Papers 1073, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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   • Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000. "Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions," Virginia Economics Online Papers 345, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 247-272, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Andres Romeu, 2002. "Structural Inferences from First-Price Auction Experiments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 531.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
5. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1997. "Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(2), pages 507-36, May.
6. Cox, James C & Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1988. " Theory and Individual Behavior of First-Price Auctions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 61-99, March.
7. Selten, Reinhard & Joachim Buchta, 1994. "Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions with Directly Observed Bid Functions," Discussion Paper Serie B 270, University of Bonn, Germany.
8. Abbink, Klaus & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 1995. "RatImage - research Assistance Toolbox for Computer-Aided Human Behavior Experiments," Discussion Paper Serie B 325, University of Bonn, Germany.
9. W. Güth & R. Ivanova-Stenzel & E. Wolfstetter, . "Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions: An Experimental Study," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 2001-15, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
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   • Guth, Werner & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2005. "Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1891-1913, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Plum, M, 1992. "Characterization and Computation of Nash-Equilibria for Auctions with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 393-418.
11. Marshall Robert C. & Meurer Michael J. & Richard Jean-Francois & Stromquist Walter, 1994. "Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 193-220, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2002. "On the impact of low-balling: Experimental results in asymmetric auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 69-89. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Pezanis-Christou, P, 1997. "On the Impact of Low-Balling : Experimental Results in Asymmetric Auctions," Papers 97/05, New South Wales - School of Economics.
13. Allan Corns & Andrew Schotter, 1999. "Can Affirmative Action Be Cost Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 291-305, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Corns, Allan & Schotter, Andrew, 1996. "Can Affirmative Action be Cost-Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions," Working Papers 96-02, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
14. Thomas Palfrey, 2002. "Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private Value Auctions," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000089, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
15. Mark Van Boening & Stephen Rassenti & Vernon Smith, 1998. "Numerical Computation of Equilibrium Bid Functions in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk Attitudes," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 147-159, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
17. Chen, Kay-Yut & Plott, Charles R., 1998. "Nonlinear Behavior in Sealed Bid First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 34-78, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Harrison, Glenn W, 1990. "Risk Attitudes in First-Price Auction Experiments: A Bayesian Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 72(3), pages 541-46, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Oliver Kirchkamp, & Eva Poen, & Philipp Reiß, 2006. "Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0605, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Oliver Kirchkamp & Eva Poen & J. Philipp Reiß, 2008. "Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction," Jena Economic Research Papers in Economics 2008-022, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek. [Downloadable!]
   • Kirchkamp, Oliver & Poen, Eva & Rei, J. Philipp, 2009. "Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 153-169, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Tibor Neugebauer, 2007. "Bid and price effects of increased competition in the first-price auction: experimental evidence," Working Papers of CREFI-LSF (Centre of Research in Finance - Luxembourg School of Finance) 07-17, CREFI-LSF, University of Luxembourg. [Downloadable!]
3. Olivier Armantier & Nicolas Treich, 2006. "Overbidding in Independant Private-Values Auctions and Misperception of Probabilities," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-15, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]