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Collateral in Banking Policy and Adverse Selection

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  • Gilroy, Bernard Michael
  • Broll, Udo

Abstract

This paper presents a theoretical model of lending which emphasizes the role of asymmetric information and total debt service obligations between creditors and debtors. The analytical approach is based upon that of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); however, emphasis here is placed upon collateral policy aspects of credit contracts as compared to the interest rate policy aspects. It is demonstrated that under certain market constellations, even assuming a completely flexible collateral banking policy, the credit market may be characterized by a disequilibrium situation.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilroy, Bernard Michael & Broll, Udo, 1986. "Collateral in Banking Policy and Adverse Selection," MPRA Paper 18709, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:18709
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baltensperger, Ernst, 1978. "Credit Rationing: Issues and Questions," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(2), pages 170-183, May.
    2. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    3. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
    4. Kletzer, Kenneth M, 1984. "Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(374), pages 287-307, June.
    5. Smith, Bruce, 1983. "Limited Information, Credit Rationing, and Optimal Government Lending Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 305-318, June.
    6. Wette, Hildegard C, 1983. "Collateral in Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information: Note," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 442-445, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gilroy, Bernard Michael & Broll, Udo, 1988. "Market Behaviour, Information Asymmetries and Product Qualities," MPRA Paper 18655, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    asymmetric information; banking; collateral policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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