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Credit markets with asymmetric information : a survey

Author

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  • Gerhard Clemenz

    (University of Regensburg, Germany)

  • Mona Ritthaler

    (University of Regensburg, Germany)

Abstract

We attempt to survey the most important implications of informational asymmetries in credit markets. First, we review the various explanations of equilibrium credit rationing, then we discuss their robustness if collateral and loan size are used as signals of credit worthiness. Then we show the importance of the modelling strategy for the conclusions derived about credit market equilibria. Finally, we discuss the role of different contracts and conclude by suggesting areas of further research.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerhard Clemenz & Mona Ritthaler, 1992. "Credit markets with asymmetric information : a survey," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 12-26, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:fep:journl:v:5:y:1992:i:1:p:12-26
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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