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Economic role of public administration in Central Asia: Decentralization and hybrid political regime

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  • Libman, Alexander

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to understand how the organization of public administration in Central Asia shapes the results of economic development in the region. It discusses the main factors of bad quality of public administration in the region, paying particular attention to the link between political regimes and public administration. Moreover, it provides an overview of decentralization and devolution of power in Central Asian countries as one of the main channels of transformation of administration. The paper covers both formal decentralization and informal distribution of power between levels of government.

Suggested Citation

  • Libman, Alexander, 2008. "Economic role of public administration in Central Asia: Decentralization and hybrid political regime," MPRA Paper 10940, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:10940
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10940/1/MPRA_paper_10940.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2011. "Dictators And Their Viziers: Endogenizing The Loyalty–Competence Trade‐Off," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(5), pages 903-930, October.
    2. Avinash Dixit, 2006. "Predatory States and Failing States: An Agency Perspective," Working Papers 71, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    3. Avinash Dixit, 2006. "Predatory States and Failing States: An Agency Perspective," Working Papers 71, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    4. repec:pri:cepsud:131dixit is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Stark, Manuel & Ahrens, Joachim, 2012. "Economic reform and institutional change in Central Asia: Towards a new model of the developmental state?," PFH Forschungspapiere/Research Papers 2012/05, PFH Private University of Applied Sciences, Göttingen.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public administration; hybrid regimes; decentralization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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