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Making Autocracy Work

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Author Info
Besley, Timothy J.
Kudamatsu, Masayuki

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Abstract

One of the key goals of political economy is to understand how institutional arrangements shape policy outcomes. This paper studies a comparatively neglected aspect of this - the forces that shape heterogeneous performance of autocracies. The paper develops a simple theoretical model of accountability in the absence of regularized elections. Leadership turnover is managed by a selectorate - a group of individuals on whom the leader depends to hold onto power. Good policy is institutionalized when the selectorate removes poorly performing leaders from office. This requires that the selectorate’s hold on power is not too dependent on a specific leader being in office. The paper looks empirically at spells of autocracy to establish cases where it has been successful according to various objective criteria. We use these case studies to identify the selectorate in specific instances of successful autocracy. We also show that, consistent with the theory, leadership turnover in successful autocracies is higher than in unsuccessful autocracies. Finally, we show by exploiting leadership deaths from natural causes that successful autocracies appear to have found ways for selectorates to nominate successors without losing power - a feature which is also consistent with the theoretical approach.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6371.

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Date of creation: Jun 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6371

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Related research
Keywords: autocracy; democracy; development; dictatorship; political economy;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy

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References listed on IDEAS
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2008. "Autocratic rule in ethnically-diverse societies," MPRA Paper 8933, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "The Growth Effect of Democracy: Is it Heterogenous and how can it be Estimated?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2008. "¿A quién le hacen falta líderes autoritarios?," RES Working Papers 4564, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  4. Giuriato, Luisa, 2008. "Combining autocracy and majority voting: the canonical succession rules of the Latin Church," MPRA Paper 15164, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Sumon Majumdar & Sharun Mukand, 2007. "The Leader as Catalyst: On Leadership and the Mechanics of Institutional Change," Working Papers 1128, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2008. "Who Needs Strong Leaders?," RES Working Papers 4563, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
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