IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pen/papers/08-037.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Ashamed to be Selfish

Author

Listed:
  • David Dillenberger

    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

  • Philipp Sadowski

    (Department of Economics, Duke University)

Abstract

We study a two-stage choice problem, where alternatives are allocations between the decision maker (DM) and a passive recipient. The recipient observes choice behavior in stage two, while stage one choice is unobserved. Choosing selfishly in stage two, in the face of a fairer available alternative, may inflict shame on DM. DM has preferences over sets of alternatives that represent period two choices. We axiomatize a representation that identifies DM’s selfish ranking, her norm of fairness and shame. Altruism is the most prominent motive that can explain non-selfish choice. We identify a condition under which shame to be selfish can mimic altruism, when only stage-two choice is observed by the experimenter. An additional condition implies that the norm of fairness can be characterized as the Nash solution of a bargaining game induced by the second-stage choice problem. The representation is generalized to allow for finitely many recipients and applied to a simple strategic situation, a game of trust.

Suggested Citation

  • David Dillenberger & Philipp Sadowski, 2008. "Ashamed to be Selfish," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  • Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:08-037
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/working-papers/08-037.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Jean Tirole & Roland Bénabou, 2006. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1652-1678, December.
    3. Johannesson, Magnus & Persson, Bjorn, 2000. "Non-reciprocal altruism in dictator games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 137-142, November.
    4. Marco Mariotti, 1999. "Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(3), pages 733-741.
    5. Frohlich, Norman & Oppenheimer, Joe & Bernard Moore, J., 2001. "Some doubts about measuring self-interest using dictator experiments: the costs of anonymity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 271-290, November.
    6. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
    7. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869.
    8. Gary E. Bolton & Rami Zwick & Elena Katok, 1998. "Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(2), pages 269-299.
    9. William Neilson, 2006. "Axiomatic reference-dependence in behavior toward others and toward risk," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(3), pages 681-692, August.
    10. Burnham, Terence C., 2003. "Engineering altruism: a theoretical and experimental investigation of anonymity and gift giving," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 133-144, January.
    11. Koch, Alexander K. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2005. "Giving in Dictator Games: Regard for Others or Regard by Others?," IZA Discussion Papers 1703, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Broberg, Tomas & Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2007. "Is generosity involuntary?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 32-37, January.
    13. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    14. Edward Lazear & Ulrike Malmendier & Roberto Weber, 2006. "Sorting, Prices, and Social Preferences," NBER Working Papers 12041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995. "On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-1235, December.
    16. Dana, Jason & Cain, Daylian M. & Dawes, Robyn M., 2006. "What you don't know won't hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 193-201, July.
    17. James Andreoni & John Miller, 2002. "Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 737-753, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Benabou, Roland & Falk, Armin & Tirole, Jean, 2018. "Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning," IZA Discussion Papers 11665, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Özgür Evren & Stefania Minardi, 2017. "Warm‐glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(603), pages 1381-1409, August.
    3. Jinkwon Lee & Sujin Min, 2021. "The effects of repeated induction of emotions on cooperation and punishment," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 925-943, July.
    4. Zak, F., 2014. "Psychological Games in the Theory of Choice. II. Shame, Regret, Egoism and Altruism," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 12-40.
    5. Noor, Jawwad & Takeoka, Norio, 2015. "Menu-dependent self-control," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 1-20.
    6. Sarah Ridout, 2020. "A Model of Justification," Papers 2003.06844, arXiv.org.
    7. Norio Takeoka, 2006. "Temptation, Certainty Effect, and Diminishing Self-Control," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000507, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. Masatlioglu, Yusufcan & Nakajima, Daisuke & Ozdenoren, Emre, 2020. "Willpower and compromise effect," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
    9. Name-Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2016. "“Giving” in to social pressure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 99-116.
    10. Abhinash Borah, 2021. "Moral Hypocrisy in Social Preferences," Working Papers 53, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    11. Saito, Kota, 2015. "Impure altruism and impure selfishness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 336-370.
    12. Leandro Gorno, 2010. "Additive representation for preferences over menus in finite choice settings," Working Papers 1292, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    13. Ellingsen, Tore & Mohlin, Erik, 2019. "Decency," Working Papers 2019:3, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    14. Yosuke Hashidate & Keisuke Yoshihara, 2021. "Stochastic Choice and Social Preferences: Inequity Aversion versus Shame Aversion," Working Papers e155, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Barmettler, Franziska & Fehr, Ernst & Zehnder, Christian, 2012. "Big experimenter is watching you! Anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 17-34.
    2. Festré, Agnès & Garrouste, Pierre, 2014. "Somebody may scold you! A dictator experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 141-153.
    3. Branas-Garza, Pablo, 2006. "Poverty in dictator games: Awakening solidarity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 306-320, July.
    4. , & ,, 2012. "Ashamed to be selfish," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(1), January.
    5. Philipp Sadowski & David Dillenberger, 2011. "Ashamed to Be Selfish," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001193, David K. Levine.
    6. Pablo Brañas-Garza & Antonio Morales, 2005. "Moral Framing in Dictator Games by Short Sentences," ThE Papers 05/06, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    7. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.
    8. Engel, Christoph & Goerg, Sebastian J., 2018. "If the worst comes to the worst: Dictator giving when recipient’s endowments are risky," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 51-70.
    9. Simon Gächter & Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2013. "Peer Effects In Pro-Social Behavior: Social Norms Or Social Preferences?," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 548-573, June.
    10. Morgenstern, Albrecht, 2004. "Efficiency concerns and incentive provision--an experimental study," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 335-341, June.
    11. repec:stn:sotoec:1421 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Anna Dreber & Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson & David Rand, 2013. "Do people care about social context? Framing effects in dictator games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(3), pages 349-371, September.
    13. Zachary Grossman, 2014. "Strategic Ignorance and the Robustness of Social Preferences," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(11), pages 2659-2665, November.
    14. Haisley, Emily C. & Weber, Roberto A., 2010. "Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 614-625, March.
    15. Zak, F., 2014. "Psychological Games in the Theory of Choice. II. Shame, Regret, Egoism and Altruism," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 12-40.
    16. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2010. "On inequity aversion: A reply to Binmore and Shaked," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 101-108, January.
    17. Koch, Alexander K. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2005. "Giving in Dictator Games: Regard for Others or Regard by Others?," IZA Discussion Papers 1703, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    18. Grossman, Zachary, 2015. "Self-signaling and social-signaling in giving," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 26-39.
    19. Zultan, Ro’i, 2012. "Strategic and social pre-play communication in the ultimatum game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 425-434.
    20. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Mollerstrom, Johanna & Munkhammar, Sara, 2012. "Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 117-130.
    21. Pablo Brañas-Garza & Miguel A. Durán & Maria Paz Espinosa, 2009. "The Role of Personal Involvement and Responsibility in Unfair Outcomes," Rationality and Society, , vol. 21(2), pages 225-248, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    selfishness; fairness; shame; altruism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pen:papers:08-037. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Administrator (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deupaus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.