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An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Performance Incentives Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Gerald Marschke
Pascal Courty
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This paper studies a particular kind of gaming responses to explicit incentives in a large government organization. The gaming responses we consider occur when agents strategically report their performance outcomes to maximize their awards. An important contribution of this work is to examine whether this behavior diverts resources (e.g. agents' time) from productive activities or whether it simply reflects an accounting phenomenon. We evaluate the efficiency impact of the behavior we identify and find that it has a negative impact on the true goal of the organization.
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Paper provided by University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
00-12.
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Date of creation: 2000Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nya:albaec:00-12Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, BA 110 University at Albany State University of New York Albany, NY 12222 U.S.A. Phone: (518) 442-4735 Fax: (518) 442-4736
Order Information: Postal: Department of Economics, BA 110 University at Albany State University of New York Albany, NY 12222 U.S.A. Email: Web: http://www.albany.edu/economics/research/workingp/index.html
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Find related papers by JEL classification: J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
James Heckman & Carolyn Heinrich & Jeffrey Smith, 2002.
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NBER Working Papers
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Other versions: Courty, Pascal & Marschke, Gerald, 1997.
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American Economic Review ,
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Drago, Robert & Garvey, Gerald T, 1998.
"Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence ,"
Journal of Labor Economics ,
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Chevalier, Judith & Ellison, Glenn, 1997.
"Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1167-1200, December.
Other versions:
Judith A. Chevalier & Glenn D. Ellison, 1995.
"Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives ,"
NBER Working Papers
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) Chevalier, J. & Ellison, G., 1996.
"Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives ,"
Working papers
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Brown, Keith C & Harlow, W V & Starks, Laura T, 1996.
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Journal of Finance ,
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Cragg, Michael, 1997.
"Performance Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from the Job Training Partnership Act ,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 147-68, April.
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NBER Working Papers
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Other versions: Baker, George P, 1992.
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Journal of Political Economy ,
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Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991.
"Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design ,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization ,
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James J. Heckman & Jeffrey A. Smith & Christopher Taber, 1996.
"What Do Bureaucrats Do? The Effects of Performance Standards and Bureaucratic Preferences on Acceptance into the JTPA Program ,"
NBER Working Papers
5535, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Healy, Paul M., 1985.
"The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions ,"
Journal of Accounting and Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 85-107, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gerald Marschke, .
"Performance Incentives and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence from a Federal Bureaucracy ,"
Discussion Papers
00-09, State University of New York at Albany, Department of Economics.
Other versions: Stacy Dickert-Conlin & Amitabh Chandra, 1999.
"Taxes and the Timing of Birth ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 161-177, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Robert Gibbons, 1997.
"Incentives and Careers in Organizations ,"
NBER Working Papers
5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paul Oyer, 1998.
"Fiscal Year Ends And Nonlinear Incentive Contracts: The Effect On Business Seasonality ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 149-185, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Carolyn J. Heinrich & Laurence E. Lynn Jr., 1999.
"Governance And Performance: The Influence of Program Structure and Management on Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) Program Outcomes ,"
JCPR Working Papers
107, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
Gerald Marschke & Pascal Courty, .
"The Challenge of Measuring Productivity: A Case Study of Performance Measurement in a Job Training Program ,"
Discussion Papers
02-08, State University of New York at Albany, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Simon Burgess & Marisa Ratto, 2003.
"The Role of Incentives in the Public Sector: Issues and Evidence ,"
The Centre for Market and Public Organisation
03/071, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
[Downloadable!]
Gerald Marschke, .
"Performance Incentives and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence from a Federal Bureaucracy ,"
Discussion Papers
02-07, State University of New York at Albany, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
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