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Governance and Comovement Under Common Ownership

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  • Alex Edmans
  • Doron Levit
  • Devin Reilly

Abstract

This paper studies the corporate governance and asset pricing implications of investors owning blocks in multiple firms. Common wisdom is that multi-firm ownership weakens governance because the blockholder is spread too thinly. We show that this need not be the case. In a single-firm benchmark, the blockholder governs through exit, selling her stake if the firm underperforms. With multiple firms, the blockholder may sell even a value-maximizing firm, to disguise her exit from another underperforming firm as being motivated by a portfolio-wide liquidity shock. This reduces the manager's effort incentives and weakens governance. On the other hand, governance can be stronger, because selling one firm and not the other is a powerful signal of underperformance. Common ownership leads to firms' stock prices being correlated, even if their fundamentals are uncorrelated. We derive empirical predictions for the direction of correlation and for whether governance is stronger or weaker with multiple firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Alex Edmans & Doron Levit & Devin Reilly, 2014. "Governance and Comovement Under Common Ownership," NBER Working Papers 20420, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20420
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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Xiao-Lin & Li, Haofei & Ge, Xinyu & Si, Deng-Kui, 2023. "Capital market liberalization and systemic risk of non-financial firms: Evidence from Chinese Stock Connect scheme," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    2. Yusen Dong & Senhua Chen & Yixue Wu, 2023. "Keeping up with the Joneses: The role of investee peers corporate environmental responsibility," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(4), pages 1841-1855, July.
    3. Fan, Yunqi & Fu, Hui, 2020. "Institutional investors, selling pressure and crash risk: Evidence from China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(C).

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    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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