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Corporate and Personal Bankruptcy Law

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  • Michelle J. White

Abstract

Bankruptcy is the legal process by which the debts of firms, individuals, and occasionally governments in financial distress are resolved. Bankruptcy law always includes three components. First, it provides a collective framework for simultaneously resolving all debts of the bankrupt entity, regardless of when they are due. Second, it provides rules for determining how the assets and earnings used to repay are divided among creditors. Third, bankruptcy law specifies punishments intended to discourage debtors from defaulting on their debts and filing for bankruptcy. This review discusses and evaluates bankruptcy law by examining whether and when the law encourages debtors and creditors to behave in economically efficient ways. It also considers how bankruptcy law might be changed to improve economic efficiency. The review shows that there are multiple economic objectives of bankruptcy law, because the law affects has very diverse effects. Some of these objectives differ for individuals versus corporations in bankruptcy.

Suggested Citation

  • Michelle J. White, 2011. "Corporate and Personal Bankruptcy Law," NBER Working Papers 17237, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17237
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Corradin, Stefano & Gropp, Reint & Huizinga, Harry & Laeven, Luc, 2016. "The effect of personal bankruptcy exemptions on investment in home equity," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 77-98.
    2. Joshua Goodman & Adam Levitin, 2014. "Bankruptcy Law and the Cost of Credit: The Impact of Cramdown on Mortgage Interest Rates," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(1), pages 139-158.
    3. Barry Scholnick & Hyungsuk Byun, 2016. "Do Slot Machines Cause Bankruptcy? A Regulatory Natural Experiment with Exogenous Changes to Slot Locations," ERSA conference papers ersa16p607, European Regional Science Association.
    4. Keuschnigg, Christian & Kogler, Michael, 2017. "Schumpeterian Banks: Credit Reallocation and Capital Requirements," Economics Working Paper Series 1704, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, revised Dec 2019.
    5. Koning, Pierre, 2013. "Making Work Pay for the Indebted: The Effect of Debt Services on the Exit Rates of Unemployed Individuals," IZA Discussion Papers 7873, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Adrien Auclert & Will S. Dobbie & Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham, 2019. "Macroeconomic Effects of Debt Relief: Consumer Bankruptcy Protections in the Great Recession," NBER Working Papers 25685, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Dongping Xie & Mary Eschelbach Hansen, 2020. "Supply of bank loans and business debts: A view from historical bankruptcy cases," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(S1), pages 170-187, March.
    8. Hyungsuk Byun & Barry Scholnick, 2017. "Spatial Commitment Devices and Addictive Goods: Evidence from the Removal of Slot Machines from Bars," Working Papers 17-34, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    9. Ganga Bhavani & Reena Agrawal & Suhan Mendon & Cristi Spulbar & Ramona Birau, 2021. "An Empirical Investigation into Alarming Signals Ignored by the U.S. Multi-Brand Retailer J. Crew Incorporation during COVID-19 Pandemic," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(11), pages 1-21, November.
    10. Eduardo Dávila, 2020. "Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Bankruptcy Exemptions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(2), pages 870-913.
    11. Marinč, Matej & Rant, Vasja, 2014. "A cross-country analysis of bank bankruptcy regimes," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 134-150.
    12. Vyacheslav Mikhed & Barry Scholnick, 2015. "Who is screened out of social insurance programs by entry barriers? Evidence from consumer bankruptcies," Working Papers 15-40, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    13. Koning, Pierre, 2015. "Making work pay for the indebted? Assessing the effects of debt services on welfare recipients," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 152-161.
    14. Vyacheslav Mikhed & Barry Scholnick, 2014. "Financial benefits, travel costs, and bankruptcy," Working Papers 14-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    15. Keuschnigg, Christian & Kogler, Michael, 2017. "Schumpeterian Banks: Credit Reallocation and Capital Structure," CEPR Discussion Papers 12443, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Vyacheslav Mikhed & Barry Scholnick, 2016. "The Causes of Household Bankruptcy: The Interaction of Income Shocks and Balance Sheets," Working Papers 16-19, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • K35 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Personal Bankruptcy Law
    • K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law

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