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Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice

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Author Info
Alma Cohen
Liran Einav
Abstract

We use a large data set of deductible choices in auto insurance contracts to estimate the distribution of risk preferences in our sample. To do so, we develop a structural econometric model, which accounts for adverse selection by allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in both risk (probability of an accident) and risk aversion. Ex-post claim information separately identifies the marginal distribution of risk, while the joint distribution of risk and risk aversion is identified by the deductible choice. We find that individuals in our sample have on average an estimated absolute risk aversion which is higher than other estimates found in the literature. Using annual income as a measure of wealth, we find an average two-digit coefficient of relative risk aversion. We also find that women tend to be more risk averse than men, that proxies for income and wealth are positively related to absolute risk aversion, that unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences is higher relative to that of risk, and that unobserved risk is positively correlated with unobserved risk aversion. Finally, we use our results for counterfactual exercises that assess the profitability of insurance contracts under various assumptions.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 11461.

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Date of creation: Jul 2005
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11461

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Pau Olivella & Marcos Vera-Hernandez, 2006. "Testing for adverse selection into private medical insurance," IFS Working Papers W06/02, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
  2. Gee, C., 2007. "Risky Choice and Type-Uncertainty in "Deal or No Deal?"," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0758, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  3. Raj Chetty, 2006. "A Bound on Risk Aversion Using Labor Supply Elasticities," NBER Working Papers 12067, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Alma Cohen, 2006. "The Disadvantages of Aggregate Deductibles," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 6(1), pages 1055-1055. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Nicholas Barberis & Ming Huang & Richard H. Thaler, 2006. "Individual Preferences, Monetary Gambles, and Stock Market Participation: A Case for Narrow Framing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1069-1090, September. [Downloadable!]
  6. Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, 2006. "Testing for Adverse Selection with "Unused Observables"," NBER Working Papers 12112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Nicholas Barberis & Ming Huang, 2006. "The Loss Aversion / Narrow Framing Approach to the Equity Premium Puzzle," NBER Working Papers 12378, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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